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In 2013, the UK Supreme Court ruled that in a case involving a loss of liberty the compensation 
awarded by the Court of Appeal should be reduced from £10,000 to £6,500 because ‘it appears 
… that an award in the region of £6,500 would adequately compensate Mr Faulkner.’2 The 
decision in Faulkner had come on the back of a series of cases in which the English courts 
decided that the domestic approach to human rights damages should ‘mirror’ the approach of 
the European Court of Human Rights.3 Since the aim of incorporating the Convention ‘was not 
to give victims better remedies at home than they could recover in Strasbourg but to give them 
the same remedies without the delay and expense of report to Strasbourg’4. English courts 
adopted the same approach as Strasbourg: they adjusted the quantum to ECtHR judgments. 
Since before the Strasbourg court the awards for ‘just satisfaction’ were on the ‘low side’5 
compared to the normal damage awards in the UK, they lowered compensation awarded by the 
Court of appeal, justifying their award with the phrase that the amount would ‘adequately com-
pensate’ the applicant. No other reasons were given for the award nor explanations about the 
specific circumstances of the case or characteristics of the victim that may have been taken into 
account in the determination of the award. 
The approach of the UK Supreme Court in Faulkner to the determination of just satis-
faction should not come as a surprise. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights in 
relation to just satisfaction has been cloaked in mystery. Judgments of the Court regularly pro-
vide only the briefest of justifications for the award: ‘Making its assessment on an equitable 
basis, the Court awards…’6 or ‘Having regard to the relevant circumstances of the present case 
and ruling on an equitable basis…’7 Although there are rumours that the Court is using a set of 
tables to determine the amounts and maintain consistency,8 the Court has refused to publish 
these since this would limit the inherent discretionary nature of the award and would lead to 
additional disputes regarding expected sums.9 Some have interpreted this refusal as proof that 
no tables exist and that the amount of the award is determined on a case-by-case basis, ‘often 
without considering or distinguishing cases involving similar facts’.10 Already in 2001, the 
Law Commission – the law reform body for England and Wales – criticised the Court’s ap-
proach as arbitrary and lacking in transparency.11 Others have argued that damages are awarded 
intuitively.12 They have accused the Court that instead of adopting a clear approach, the lack 
of reasoned decisions articulating principles on which a remedy is afforded makes the work of 
 
2 [2013] UKSC 23, [87]. 
3 Ullah [2004] UKHL 26.  
4 Faulkner (n 2), [28], referring to R (Greenfield) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 1 WLR 
673.  
5 ibid., [27].  
6 Ushakov v Russia, app. 10641/09, 25 October 2011.  
7 Jashi v Georgia, app. 10799/06, 8 January 2013.  
8 Cocchiarella v Italy, app. 64886/01, 9 March 2006.  
9 D. Harris, M. O'Boyle, E. Bates, and C. Buckley. Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford, 
OUP 2014) 156.  
10 The Law Commission. “Damages Under the Human Rights Act 1998 – Report”, (2001) Cm 4853, SE/2000/182; 
P. Leach. “Access to the European Court of Human Rights – From a Legal Entitlement to a Lottery”, (2006) 27 
HRLJ 11-25. 
11 Law Commission (ibid).  
12 Franz Bydlinski, ‘Methodological Approaches to the Tort Law of the ECHR’, in Attila Fenyves, Ernst Karner, 
Helmut Koziol & Elisabeth Steiner eds., Tort Law in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
(De Gruyter, 2011) 176; C. Kissling & D. Kelliher, ‘Compensation for Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Loss’, in 
ibid., 579; O. Ichim, Just Satisfaction under the European Convention on Human Rights 121 (CUP, 2015).  
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practitioners and national judges seeking to apply the ECtHR approach across Member States 
difficult.13  
As Faulkner shows, the ECtHR’s refusal to set out any rules or guidelines as to when 
individuals are likely to get compensation or indeed which elements of their treatment might 
affect the ultimate award provides little opportunity to English courts to bolster mechanisms to 
remedy human rights violations at home.14 As an international court responsible for interpret-
ing the Convention and ensuring that Member States abide by obligations set out there, the case 
law of the ECtHR affects the laws and practice of 47 states. Every one of these countries is 
bound to comply with decisions of the Court and enforce human rights appropriately on the 
domestic level. Yet, the uncertain practice of the ECtHR provides little clarity as to how non-
pecuniary damage ought to be determined. If the European human rights system seeks to 
change the behaviour of states by encouraging them to embed the protection of the Convention 
into their domestic legal systems, then in the context of damages such internalisation might 
lead to a perverse situation where it could perpetuate or even encourage the lack of clarity on 
the part of domestic judges. In the UK, a two-tier system is now in place, where damages under 
tort law considerably outweigh human rights awards.15 Whilst the rules relating to the former 
are clear, no one knows how human rights awards are determined. As judges assert, ‘we have 
no principles’ to apply.16 
Given the impact of the practice of the ECtHR case law on jurisdictions which have 
embedded the Convention into their own legal systems and the immense legal gap that exists 
both on the international and domestic level, it is high time to elucidate the practice of the Court 
in relation to just satisfaction. A first empirical study that sought to fill this gap was published 
a couple of years ago, when scholars from Max Planck Institute found that the ‘frequently 
voiced academic reproach that the Court’s practice is arbitrary or unprincipled’ is incorrect. 
They found that the Court does follow the hierarchy (or ‘ranking’) inherent in the Convention 
and awards higher damages for absolute rights violations compared to procedural breaches.17 
However, the study only investigated a year of the Court’s practice18 and apart from the ‘rank-
ing’ did not identify other variables that may affect the determination of damages. It is still 
unclear, for example, whether the just satisfaction is aimed at redressing the suffering of the 
victim, affirming his or her rights under the Convention, or whether it is aimed at governments 
 
13 J. Beatson, S. Grosz, T. Hickman, R. Singh, S. Palmer. Human Rights: Judicial Protection in the United King-
dom (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2008); L. Lester, D. Pannick and J. Herberg. Human Rights Law and Practice 
(London, LexisNexis 3rd edition, 2009). 
14 Generally L Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural 
Principle of the European Human Rights Regime (2008) 19 EJIL 125–159. On the particularities of the internali-
sation of the ECHR by English courts, V. Fikfak ‘English Courts and the ‘internalisation’ of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights – Between Theory and Practice.’ (2013-2014) 5 Cambridge Journal of International 
and Comparative Law – The UK Supreme Court Yearbook (April 2015) 183; ‘International Law Before English 
and Asian Courts: Finding the Judicial Role in the Separation of Powers’, Asian Journal of International Law, 
3(2), 271; and Burnett B. et al, ‘Domestic Courts’ Reading of International Norms: A Semiotic Analysis’, Int J 
Semiot Law (2009) 22: 437.  
15 J Varuhas. Damages for Breaches of Human Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2016).  
16 Some judges recognise this, saying ‘We have no principles’. Others responded: ‘We have principles, we just do 
not apply them.’ See D Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford, OUP 3rd edition, 2015) 
2. Though it should be noted that individual judges are hard at work to try and distil principles from ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence (see Lord Reed and Carnwath in Faulkner).   
17 S Altwicker, T. Altwicker, A Peters. ‘Measuring Violations of Human Rights: An Empirical Analysis of Awards 
in Respect of Non-Pecuniary Damage Under the European Convention on Human Rights’ Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV)/Heidelberg Journal of International Law (HJIL) 76 
(2016), 1-51, 43.  
18 The choice of the year was also problematic (2006), since this is supposedly the year in which just satisfaction 
Unit sought to change/standardise the Court’s approach to damages. Harris (n 9) 156.  
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and intended to primarily act as a ‘serious and effective means of dissuasion’ of repetitive 
unlawful conduct. 19 These questions are not merely about which variables potentially affect 
the Court’s approach to damages. Instead, they go to the very heart of the Court’s identity.  
Ever since its inception and the drafting of the Convention, there has been a serious 
tension between two visions of the purpose of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
One perspective views as the soul of the Convention ‘the entitlement of each and every com-
plainant to examination of his or her complaint and, if it is upheld, to individualized relief.’20 
From this perspective, the Court’s mission is to hear every individual complaint and focus the 
proceedings before the Court on the victim of the violation and the vindication of his or her 
right. The other perspective sees the mission of the Court as enforcing the Convention as the 
‘constitutional instrument of the European public order’.21 In this regard, the ECtHR judgments 
seek to raise the general standard of protection of human rights in the country concerned and 
across the community of states by correcting the defects in the national approaches of Member 
States. From this ‘constitutional justice’ perspective, the role of the Court is mainly ‘corrective’ 
and focused on the state, rather than the victim. 
These two competing visions have been debated every time that a new reform of the 
Convention system is proposed.22 For example, when the new pilot procedure was introduced 
in 2008, as a solution to the Court’s increasing work load, it was welcomed because it allowed 
the Court to summarily deal with hundreds of repetitive claims against a respondent state and 
require that the state adopt legislative and administrative measures to address the systemic 
problem. Yet, advocates of individual justice argued that the Court had to look beyond the 
numbers to ensure that the Court’s new admissibility criteria would not lead to well-founded 
applications being dismissed without sufficient review.23 In the end, both proponents of the 
constitutional and individual justice ‘were positive in their reception of the pilot judgment 
mechanism.’24 It represented a good compromise between a more constitutional role for the 
Court ‘ordering member states to adopt general measures’, whilst still preserving a forum for 
individuals’ claims to be heard.25 
Whilst this old debate is reignited anytime a new reform of the Convention system is 
proposed, there is little if any discussion on how it has affected the Court’s handling of damages 
and in particular, its approach to non-pecuniary damages. From the individual justice perspec-
tive, the primary function of damages is presumably to address the harm done to the victim. If 
the applicant has suffered ‘evident trauma’, ‘pain and suffering, distress, anxiety’, they should 
be compensated for their suffering and placed in the same position as they would be had no 
injury occurred.26 In contrast, for constitutionalists the remedies adopted by the Court should 
be such as to motivate and incentivise the state to change its behaviour and avoid future repet-
 
19 Guiso-Gallisay v Italy, app. 58858/00, 22 December 2009, [85].  
20 P. Mahoney "New Challenges for the European Court of Human Rights Resulting from the Expanding Case 
Load and Membership," (2002) 21 Penn State International Law Review 101, 104.  
21 Loizidou v. Turkey , 310 ECtHR, Series A No 310 (1995), at 27. 
22 Mahoney (n 20) 101; Luzius Wildhaber, ‘A Constitutional Future for the European Court on Human Rights?’ 
(2002) 23 HRLJ 161. 
23 J Gerards, ‘Inadmissibility Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: A Critique of the Lack of Rea-
soning’ (2014) 14 Human Rights Law Review 148.  
24 D. Kurban, ‘Forsaking Individual Justice: The Implications of the European Court of Human Rights’ Pilot 
Judgment Procedure for Victims of Gross and Systematic Violations’ (2016) 16 Human Rights Law Review 731, 
735.  
25 ibid.  
26 Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v Spain, app 10590/83, 13 June 1994, [16], following Ringeisen v Austria, 
app. 2614/65, 22 June 1972, [21]. 
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itive conduct. Just satisfaction for example could act as a ‘serious and effective means of dis-
suasion with regard to the repetition of unlawful conduct of the same type’.27 In this regard, 
the Council of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe have ex-
plicitly supported the use of punitive damages against states to ensure the effectiveness of EC-
tHR judgments.28  
These two visions reveal very different conceptions of the identity and role of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights as one of the most important and influential human rights courts 
in the world. One vision sees it focusing on the victim, the other on the state. Each of these 
requires a very different approach to monetary damages. In particular, the determination of 
what constitutes ‘just’ in the phrase ‘just satisfaction’ necessitates an answer to the question 
who is at the centre of the determination of monetary damages – the individual victim or the 
perpetrator state.29 This paper aims to answer this question. It empirically analyses 13 years 
of ECtHR’s case-law in relation to Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment) and 5 (arbitrary detention) of the Convention. The goal is to understand whether the 
statements made by the Court about the aims pursued through just satisfaction are confirmed 
in practice. Through an empirical quantitative study relating to non-pecuniary damages, the 
paper will quantitatively analyse the practice of the Court in awarding non-pecuniary damages 
for human rights violations and compare it to the competing visions of the ECtHR’s function. 
In particular, I am interested in determining whether just satisfaction is aimed at redressing the 
suffering of the victim, her circumstances and vulnerability, or whether the focus is more on 
the respondent state, its conduct and its past human rights record. The answers to these ques-
tions will contribute to the debate whether the ECtHR’s role is one of delivering ‘individual 
justice’ or whether the Court is – as an international court enforcing an international treaty – 
focused on the ‘state’.  
I. COMPETING VISIONS OF THE ECTHR’S FUNCTION 
Article 41 of the ECHR provides that  
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, 
and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial repara-
tion to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party. 
The requirement for just satisfaction to be awarded are therefore (i) a finding of a violation, (ii) 
internal law allows only partial reparation and (iii) if necessary to afford just satisfaction.30  
The first pre-condition is straightforward.31
 
The second is of no more than historical 
significance for the Strasbourg Court.
 
In some of the early cases, there were suggestions that, 
even after a finding of violation, these words imposed a limit on the Strasbourg Court’s juris-
diction to consider just satisfaction until the extent of reparation under the domestic law had 
 
27 Guiso-Gallisay v Italy (n 19).  
28 Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly), Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Doc. 8808 (2000), para. 94.  
29  J. Varuhas. "A Tort-Based Approach to Damages under the Human Rights Act 1998", (2009) 72 Modern Law 
Review 750-782; D. Feldman. “Remedies for Violations of Convention Rights under the Human Rights Act”, 
(1998) European Human Rights Law Review 691.  
30 Guzzardi v Italy, app. 7367/76, 6 November 1980, [114].  
31 Butsee Caballero v United Kingdom, app. 32819/96, 8 February 2000, for the application of Article 41 where 
liability is conceded, so that there is no actual “finding” of a violation.  
  6 
been fully explored.32
 
In practice, however, the ‘partial reparation’ test is easily satisfied, and 
the Court has reserved for itself jurisdiction to consider the question of just satisfaction in vir-
tually all cases where a violation is found.33 Having found a violation, the Strasbourg Court 
has been willing to grant a remedy without requiring the applicant to return to the domestic 
system.34 Even when the first two pre-conditions are met, an award of damages will not be 
made unless the Court considers that it is ‘necessary’ to afford just satisfaction to the injured 
party. This final requirement gives the Strasbourg Court a wide discretion to determine when 
an award of damages should be made.35 Damages are not available as of right. In practice, the 
Court has ‘frequently [held] that the finding of a violation is sufficient satisfaction without any 
further award.’36 Even if a violation has been established, therefore, an award of damages is 
not guaranteed. Instead, the applicant will have to have suffered some loss and the intensity of 
his suffering will have to be such as to ‘justify an award of compensation for non-pecuniary 
damage.’37  
The phrasing of Article 41 accords great discretion to the Court and imposes few, if 
any, limits on the Court’s powers. The choice of terminology by the drafters (‘satisfaction’) 
appears to even further contribute to the Court’s extensive powers. In the ILC Articles of State 
Responsibility, the term ‘satisfaction’ requires that the offending state provide satisfaction for 
the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or compensation. 
At first sight, therefore, ‘satisfaction’ appears to be differentiated from monetary damages and 
may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology 
or another appropriate modality.38 In this sense, ‘satisfaction’ under the Convention could refer 
to other type of remedies than compensation. Yet, through the case law, the Court has only 
ever made monetary awards and has only exceptionally required other action from Member 
States.39 Yet, perhaps monetary damages under the heading of ‘just satisfaction’ may have been 
used by the Court not primarily for individuals’ benefit but as ‘punishment of the guilty’ and 
‘assurance as to future conduct…’40 The choice of the terminology – together with the Court’s 
consistent jurisprudence awarding monetary damages – therefore allows for several different 
interpretations of ‘just satisfaction’ under the Convention. It enables the Court to pursue either 
of the aims of individual and constitutional justice.  
 
32 Some judges have argued that today this phrase should be given more emphasis and that the determination of 
damages would be left to domestic courts. P. Mahoney. “Thinking a Small Unthinkable: Repatriating Reparation 
from the European Court of Human Rights to the National Legal Order” in Liber Amicorum Luzius Wildhaber: 
Human Rights – Strasbourg Views (Kehl, 2007) 263-283. 
33 A claim for just satisfaction is viewed, not as an independent procedure, but as a part of an entire claim, of 
which the question of liability forms the first part: see P van Dijk and GJH van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (3rd ed 1998) 241.  
34 De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v Belgium (No 2) A 14 (1972), 1 EHRR 438, [16], where the court noted that 
obliging the applicant to return to the domestic courts would mean that “...the total length of the procedure... 
would scarcely be in keeping with the idea of the effective protection of Human Rights. Such a requirement would 
lead to a situation incompatible with the aim and object of the Convention...”.  
35 Grosz, Beatson and Duffy, Human Rights: The 1998 Act and the European Convention (n 13) 144 on ‘broad 
discretionary exercise.’ 
36 A v UK (2009) 49 EHRR 29, [250].  
37 Silver v UK, Series A 67 (1983), 6 EHRR 62, [10].  
38 Art 37 of Articles of State Responsibility.  
39 Volkov v. Ukraine, Appl. no. 21722/11, Judgment of 9 January 2013, where Article 41 was used together with 
Article 46.  
40 Shelton (n 16) 157.   
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A. Individual Justice and the Focus on the Victim  
In its case law, the Court has affirmed that ‘the primary purpose of the Convention system is 
to provide individual relief’.41 Individuals therefore have a right to submit an application di-
rectly to the European Court of Human Rights and to receive a binding determination from the 
Court of whether the facts presented constitute a violation of their rights and finally, they may 
be entitled to a remedy to address this breach.42 The focus on the individual and his or her right 
therefore ‘lies at the heart of the European regional system for the protection of human rights.’43  
Such focus on the victim requires a very specific approach to just satisfaction. In her 
book Remedies in International Human Rights Law, Dinah Shelton sets out a legal framework 
expressing the functions that damages should play in the context of human rights violations. 
She notes that in most legal systems, including the international legal system, the primary func-
tion of damages is compensatory, that is to address the wrong done to a victim and correct the 
injustice. When a violation occurs, the balance between the victim and perpetrator is upset and 
the aim of compensatory justice is to ‘make the parties equal by the penalty (a judge) imposes, 
whereby he takes from the aggressor any gain he may have secured.’44 In this regard, a need 
arises to establish a new balance between the perpetrator’s gain and victim’s loss, which in-
volves finding the mean between the loss and gain.45 This view comes from the perspective 
that the two parties – the victim and perpetrator – are equal and that when damage is inflicted 
by one on the other, the remedy has to restore the victim to the condition they were in before.46 
When such restitution is not possible, damages offer the ‘second best’ option to compensate 
for the loss or harm inflicted.  
As Shelton argues, this view appears to have been transposed into the context of human 
rights, where wrongs are committed against individual victims. The ECtHR, for example, in-
sists that since the Convention seeks to protect ‘human rights’, all rights-infringing conduct 
assaults the dignity and equality of the victim.47 The Court argues that when the applicant has 
suffered ‘evident trauma’, ‘pain and suffering, distress, anxiety’, the award seeks to ‘give 
recognition to the fact that moral damage occurred as a result of a breach of a fundamental 
human right’48 and to compensate the victim and place them in the same position as they would 
have been had no injury occurred; in other words, restitutio in integrum.49 However, if the 
nature of the injury suffered is such that it may make it impossible to return to the situation 
existing prior to the breach, then the only claim the applicant can make is for just satisfaction, 
ie monetary damages.50  
In this regard, the Court’s Practice Directions state that the Court ‘will make an assess-
ment on an equitable basis, having regard to the standards which emerge from its case-law.’51 
 
41 Karner v. Austria (2004) 38 EHRR 528, [26]. 
42 Amnesty International’s Comments on the Interim Activity Report: Guaranteeing the Long-Term Effectiveness 
of the European Court of Human Rights, AI Index: IOR 61/005/2004, February 2004, para. 5. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Aristotle, trans. J.A.K. Thompson as The Ethics (London 1955) 148-9.  
45 Ibid. 
46 E. Weinrib ‘Understanding Tort Law’ (1989) 23 Val. U.L. Rev. 485.  
47 Shelton (n 16); C. McCrudden 2008. “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) 
19(4) EJIL 655-724. 
48 Varnava and others v. Turkey, [App. Nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 
16071/90, 16072/90, 16073/90, (Eur. Ct. H.R. September 18, 2009), para. 224].   
49 Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v Spain [A 285-C (1994) (just satisfaction), para 16], following Ringeisen v 
Austria [A 15 (1972), 1 EHRR 504 (just satisfaction), para 21]. 
50 Konig v Germany [Series A 36 (1980), 2 EHRR 469 (just satisfaction), para 15].  
51  Rules of the Court, Practice Directions, at 60ff, available at 
www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts/rules/practicedirections, para 14.  
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The Directions explicitly invite applicants who wish to be compensated for non-pecuniary 
damage to ‘specify a sum which in their view would be equitable’.52 As long as the victim’s 
claim is ‘equitable’, it appears, the compensatory model would allow for the victim’s self-
assessment of loss to be taken into account in determination of damages.  
In the context of compensating the victim for the suffering, the Court looks at the ap-
plicant’s ‘loss’. It looks at whether the victim has suffered psychological harm;53 distress;54 
frustration;55  inconvenience;56 humiliation;57 anxiety;58 loss of reputation;59  sense of injus-
tice60 and loss of relationship.61 In certain situations the degree of loss incurred may be insuf-
ficient to justify a monetary award.62 This is the case when, for example, an individual appli-
cant has suffered anxiety and frustration as a result of a violation but this is not ‘of such inten-
sity that it would in itself justify an award of compensation for non-pecuniary damage’.63 In 
establishing whether or not damages will be awarded, the Court is therefore looking for ‘situ-
ations [in which] the impact of the violation may be regarded as being of a nature and degree 
to have impinged so significantly on the moral well-being of the applicant as to require some-
thing further [than a finding of a violation].’64 In the context of torture, which we study below, 
the Court has underlined that ‘even in the most difficult circumstances,… the Convention pro-
hibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’65 In this 
context, the conduct has to attain a ‘minimum level [of severity] if it is to fall within the scope 
of Article 3.’66 Once such a violation is established, then a certain level of suffering is assumed 
as inherent in Article 3 violations and an award seeking to compensate a victim’s suffering is 
highly likely. The same would apply for Article 2 (right to life) and (though to a lesser extent) 
for Article 5.  
If the Court is seeking to compensate the victim for their loss, then we should expect 
the Court to follow the ‘individualisation principle’, that is to adjust the amount of compensa-
tion ‘to the concrete situation of each’ victim.67 In its judgments, the Court does state that it 
looks to ‘all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or 
mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim, etc.’68 Yet 
whilst the Court asserts that these characteristics relating to the applicant may play a role in the 
determination of the ‘minimum level of severity’ and establishment of a violation under Article 
3,69 it is unclear whether they affect the level of compensation. Judge de Albuquerque has in-
sisted that this has to be the case and that the compensatory model which puts the victim at the 
 
52 Ibid para 15.  
53 Aydin v Turkey, app.no. 23178/94, 25 September 1997. 
54 Hokkanen v Finland (1994) Series A no. 44.  
55 Van Der Leer v The Netherlands (1990) Series A No. 170. 
56 Olsson v Sweden (No. 2) (1990) Series A No. 250.  
57 Young, James and Webster, app. No. 7601/76, 18 October 1982.  
58 Loper Ostra v Spain (1994) Series A No. 303C. 
59 Sakik v Turkey (1998) 26 EHRR 662.  
60 Devlin v United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 43.  
61 W. v United Kingdom (1988) Series A No 136-C.  
62 Law Commission (n 10) [3, 44].  
63 Silver and others v UK, app. No. 5947/72, 24 October 1983, para 10; also see Faulkner v UK, Campbell v UK, 
Schonenberg v Switzerland, etc.  
64 Varnava (n 48) 224. The idea of a threshold for recovery of damages for non-pecuniary loss was rejected by 
the Law Commission in its report.  
65 Aksoy v Turkey, app.no. 59741/00, 31 October 2006, [62].   
66 UK v Ireland [1978] EHRR 25, Ser A, [162]. 
67 Mironovas v Lithuania, app. No. 40828/12, 8 December 2015.  
68 ibid.  
69 Y v UK, app.no. 14229/88, 29 October 1992, Report of the European Commission, paras 43-4.  
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centre of the claim has to adapt compensation depending on the personal circumstances of the 
applicant.70  
One particular manner of adjusting the remedy to the victim is to take into account their 
vulnerability. Noticeably, the Court has taken important steps – through the development of 
‘positive obligations’ to recognise and ‘increase human rights protection for some of the most 
vulnerable people in society.’71 These include members of younger and elderly applicants,72 
women, and members of unpopular minorities, who are often ‘unprotected by the ordinary 
democratic process.’73 The question, however, arises whether this vulnerability is recognised 
(or taken into account) also when the Court sets damages. A person in detention has been rec-
ognised to be automatically ‘in a vulnerable situation’ whilst in the charge of the state and the 
authorities have a duty to protect such a person.74 A disabled or otherwise unhealthy prisoner 
may for example require special adjustments to be made for them or to be released from jail if 
such adjustments are impossible.75 Commentators insist that in such cases, damages awarded 
to the applicant for the failure of the state to provide the duty of care to the vulnerable victim 
ought to be adapted ‘to the circumstances of the case’.76 In this regard, the individual’s personal 
situation should influence the quantum. In relation to the vulnerability of victims, Ichim, for 
example, argues that ‘if the victim is particularly vulnerable …, the award will go towards the 
maximum limit.’77  
B. Constitutional Justice and the Focus on State’s Conduct  
Whilst no one disputes the Court’s assertion that its aim is to provide individual justice, the 
question that arises is whether this should take priority over the Court’s other aims. From the 
constitutional justice perspective, the mission of the Court is not exclusively limited to indi-
viduals, but rather it focuses on 
the more general purposes of ensuring that each Convention country puts in place within 
its own internal legal order effective means for securing the guaranteed rights (subsidiary 
facet); avoiding repetition of circumstances giving rise to a violation of the guaranteed 
rights (preventive facet); and welding together a human rights community of nations with 
shared legal values across the whole mosaic of post-1989 Europe (unifying facet).78  
The pursuit of ‘constitutional justice’ is therefore an ‘attempt’ to ensure that the Court selects 
and adjudicates cases in a manner to most effectively identify, condemn, and resolve violations 
across the Council of Europe and prevent similar future breaches. The focus is therefore on the 
respondent state and on addressing the structure or modus operandi of its institutions. In this 
sense, individual cases through which the court works, serve to elucidate the Convention prin-
ciples which can be applied by national authorities.  
 
70 Mironovas (n 67).  
71 A Donald, J Gordon and P Leach, ‘The UK and the European Court of Human Rights’ Equality and Human 
Rights Commission Research report 83, 110. 
72 M and C. v Romania, app.no. 29032/04, 27 September 2011, para 119. 
73 Ben Emmerson ‘The European Court of Human Rights enhances our democracy’ The Independent, 8 February 
2011. 
74  Esen v. Turkey, no. 29484/95, para 28; Yaz v. Turkey, no. 29485/95, para 30; and Ayşe Tepe v. Turkey, 
no. 29422/95, 22 July 2003.  
75  Mircea Dumitrescu v Romania app.no. 14609/10, 30 July 2013 (wheelchair); Wenerski v Poland app.no. 
38719/09, 24 July 2012 (epilepsy).  
76 Ichim (n 12) 6.5.3.  
77 ibid.  
78 Mahoney (n 20) 105.  
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From this perspective, the aim of remedies used by the Court is not so much to redress 
the loss suffered by the victim, but to hold the wrongdoer responsible for his conduct and po-
tentially to ‘encourage, cajole, and, where necessary, sanction insufficiently resourced or re-
calcitrant countries to deter human rights violations from occurring’ in the future.79 There are 
therefore two aspects to damages – the punitive and the preventive.  
As Shelton argues, ‘[t]he wrong is an essential element’. ‘[I]t is the rights-infringing 
wrongful conduct that is the source of a claim’ and which triggers the need to provide restitu-
tion to the victim through compensation.80 The Court has explicitly adopted this approach: it 
asserts that the ‘seriousness of the violation’ plays a crucial role in the determination of dam-
ages.81 In this regard, it pays special attention to how the particular form of state conduct should 
be qualified. Within Article 3, for example, the Court draws distinctions embodied in the pro-
vision: whether the ill-treatment should be qualified as torture, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment.82 In particular in relation to torture, the Court has said that, ‘it was the intention that the 
Convention with its distinction between torture and inhuman treatment should by the first of 
these terms attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and 
cruel suffering.’83 Since the victim cannot be ‘un-tortured’ or ever adequately compensated for 
her loss, damages in such cases may be used to condemn the act itself, the wrong, and even to 
impose a penalty on the perpetrator. 84 In this regard, retributive justice seeks to restore the 
balance between the wrongdoer and the victim by permitting survivors of human rights abuses 
who experience deep emotions of anger and hatred an opportunity to see the wrongdoer pun-
ished. 
The punitive model focuses very clearly on the action of the defendant – the respondent 
state – and on its conduct. But if damages are to have a deterrent effect, then behavioural econ-
omists argue that they have to be sufficiently high or framed retributively, so as to produce an 
incentive to change noncompliant behaviour. Eisenberg and Engel show, for example, that de-
pending on the amount of damages, actors may be deterred the more uncertain the threat of the 
sanction and the higher its severity if they were sanctioned in the past.85 Both the certainty and 
the harshness of damages may be at play, as well as players’ previous experiences. Therefore, 
if a respondent state is a repetitive violator and systemically breaches human rights, it would 
be expected that if the Court wished for damages to a have a deterrent effect, just satisfaction 
would increase with the number of similar cases, at times perhaps drastically to incentivise the 
state (through unpredictable judicial approach to damages) to change its conduct.86  
 
79 Helfer (n 15) 155.  
80 Shelton (n 16) 20. 
81 T.M. and C.M. v Moldova 26608/11, 28 January 2014.  
82 Aydın v. Turkey, 25 September 1997, §§ 83, 84 and 86, Reports 1997-VI; Selmouni v. France [GC];], no. 
25803/94, § 105, ECHR 1999V; Dikme v. Turkey;, no. 20869/92, §§ 94-96, ECHR 2000-VIII; and, among recent 
authorities, Batı and Others v. Turkey, nos. 33097/96 and 57834/00, § 116, ECHR 2004-IV (extracts), and Me-
nesheva v. Russia. , no. 59261/00, § 55, ECHR 2006-III). 
83 Ireland v UK 18 January 1978, Series A No 25 (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25, [167].  
84 Shelton (n 16) 12. 
85 Eisenberg and Engel, ‘Assuring Civil Damages Adequately Deter: A Public Good Experiment’, 11(2) Journal 
of Empirical Legal Studies (2014). 
86 Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque and Anne van Aaken, ‘Punitive Damages in Strasbourg’, in A. van Aaken and I. 
Motoc (eds), The ECHR and General International Law (2017) 230. I first raised this hypothesis in V. Fikfak 
‘What price for human rights? Compensation for human rights violations’ Impact, Volume 2017, Number 9, No-
vember 2017, pp. 6-8(3).  
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Whilst international law has always made use of the material inducement approach to 
change state practices,87 the idea of punitive damages has generally been rejected. Compensa-
tion is not intended ‘to punish the responsible State, nor … have an expressive or exemplary 
character’.88  In fact, even when a serious breach of an international obligation has occurred, 
‘the award of punitive damages is not recognized in international law.’89 Even more, after the 
International Law Commission made a proposal for damages to reflect the gravity of the 
breach, the overwhelmingly negative reaction led the Rapporteur to conclude that ‘the idea of 
punitive damages under international law is currently unsustainable’.90 The ECtHR explicitly 
accepts this approach and has until now not considered it appropriate to accept claims for dam-
ages with labels such as ‘punitive’, ‘aggravated’ or ‘exemplary’.91 As the Court insists: dam-
ages ‘serve to give recognition to the fact that moral damage occurred as a result of a breach 
of a fundamental human right and reflect in the broadest of terms the severity of the damage; 
they are not, nor should they be, intended to give financial comfort or sympathetic enrichment 
at the expense of the Contracting Party concerned’.92 In this sense, the Court has rejected that 
awards could serve ‘some collective interest, such as the public interest in punishing a wrong-
doing state or in rendering respect for human rights more effective in general.’93  
Yet, as De Albuquerque and Van Aaken note, these statements rejecting punitive dam-
ages do not mean that the Court may not in practice already be punishing states for certain 
types of behaviour.94 In their article, they list at least seven ways in which the Court has acted 
punitively, including in Cyprus v Turkey, in which the Court awarded millions in non-pecuni-
ary damages although the exact number of individual victims of human rights violations was 
not established and the victims in the Karpas region were neither identified nor identifiable on 
the basis of the evidence in the file. As a consequence – Pinto argues in his concurring opinion 
– ‘the claimant State will be the final beneficiary of the amounts paid by the respondent State. 
The punitive nature of this compensation is flagrant’.95 Pinto welcomes this approach, under-
lying that ‘punitive damages [are] an appropriate and necessary instrument for fulfilling the 
Court’s mission to uphold human rights in Europe and ensuring the observance of the engage-
ments undertaken by the Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols.’ For Pinto 
this ‘conclusion applies with even greater force in the case at hand, where the respondent State 
not only committed a multitude of gross human rights violations over a significant period of 
time in northern Cyprus, and did not investigate the most significant of these violations ade-
quately and in a timely manner, but also deliberately failed year after year to comply with the 
Grand Chamber’s judgment on the merits delivered a long time ago with regard to these spe-
cific violations.’96 
The discussion of punitive damages is not limited to Cyprus v Turkey. In Guiso-Galli-
say v Italy, the Court explicitly stated that Article 41 awards must be ‘a serious and effective 
means of dissuasion with regard to the repetition of unlawful conduct of the same type, without 
 
87 R. Goodman and D. Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights Through International Law (2013) 125. 
88 Commentary to the ILC Articles on State Responsibility 2001, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/eng-
lish/commentaries/962001.pdf: 99.  
89 ibid 111. 
90 James Crawford, State Responsibility (CUP  2013) 526.  
91 Practice Directions (n 51) para 9; Akdivar v Turkey, app.no. 21893/93, 1 April 1998; 
 
Selçuk and Asker v Turkey, 
app.no. 23184/94, 24 April 1998.  
92 Varnava (n 48), para. 224.   
93 Altwicker (n 17) 11.  
94 Pinto and van Aaken (n 87); Fikfak (n 1) EJIL article where I query whether the Court has imposed punitive 
damages implicitly/covertly.  
95 Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 25, Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, paras 12–13 (emphasis 
added). 
96 Ibid., para. 19. 
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however assuming a punitive function.’97 The debate about the introduction of such ‘exem-
plary’ or ‘aggravated’ damages has also been present in the Committee of Ministers. The Com-
mittee has previously explicitly supported the use of punitive damages to ensure the effective-
ness of ECtHR judgments, as has the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which 
considered the introduction of fines to be imposed on states that persistently fail to execute the 
judgments of the Court, with a view to introducing more effective measures in the face of non-
compliance.98 The issue was debated most recently in relation to the Brighton Declaration, 
where the UK ‘invited the Committee of Ministers to consider the introduction of a financial 
penalty where a failure to implement a judgment leads to a significant number of repetitive 
applications to the Court’.99 However, these proposals did not make it into the final draft. 
The images below summarise the two models:  
 
Victim model vs State model 
II. THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
To establish what approach the ECtHR takes to ‘just satisfaction’, I looked at all cases in which 
a violation of Article 2 – right to life, Article 3 – torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and 
Article 5 – arbitrary detention was established between the beginning of 2003 and end of 2015 
(13 years).100 This resulted in for Article 2: 267 cases, 791 victims; for Article 3: 771 cases, 
totalling 1128 victims;101 and for Article 5: 867 cases, 1247 victims. All the cases analysed are 
violations of a single article. I therefore excluded cases in which there were violations of more 
than one article (eg cases in which Article 2, 3, or 5 was found to have been violated in addition 
to other articles of the Convention). This was done in order to isolate the effect that multiple 
violations may have on quantum and to be able to see – further down the line – whether the 
Court adopts a structured approach to different violations which are internal to each article, 
rather than just distinguishing between different articles. In certain models in the regression 
 
97 Guiso-Gallisay v. Italy (n 19) para 85. 
98 Council of Europe (n 28), para. 94. 
99 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Draft Brighton Declaration, 23 
February 2012, paragraph 36(d).  
100 At the beginning of this project (January 2016), we initially chose the last 10 years of cases, however, we added 
additional 3 years (2003-2006) after learning that the Court set out to reform its practice to damages in 2006. 
(Harris et al 2014, (n 9)).  This expanded dataset allows us to try and test whether indeed a shift took place and 
assess its impact.  
101 I excluded extradition cases because the aim of these cases is to prevent deportation for fear of a potential 
Article 3 violation and no compensation is awarded. The Court concluded that a finding per se amounted to just 
satisfaction. See Soering v UK, Chahal v UK, and Ahmed v Austria.  
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analysis, further victims are missing due to missing data. These are limited to cases in which 
the age of the applicant was not provided by the Court.  
Initially, the study focused only on Article 3. This was for several reasons: first, ac-
cording to the Court the article enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic 
society. Yet, Article 3 is the second most frequently violated article in the Convention and 
represents 23% of the violations established by the Court.102 Secondly, the Convention prohib-
its torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in absolute terms. This means that in comparison 
to other articles, no proportionality assessment takes place and that a violation of Article 3 
takes place irrespective of the victim’s conduct. As regards damages, this would suggest that 
the values protected in the provision are considered highly important. Thirdly, although Article 
3 in comparison to the UN Convention against Torture prohibits clearly all three forms of ill-
treatment, a distinction appears to be drawn between the different degrees of ill-treatment.103 
The internal hierarchy between the different concepts, in particular between torture and the 
other violations, may be especially amenable to a statistical analysis and may show the Court’s 
attitude towards different forms of ill-treatment by the state.  
In the second stage of the study and after interviews with judges, I have additionally 
included both Article 2 and Article 5 into the analysis. This was done in order to verify whether 
the pattern that was identified in the context of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, can 
also be confirmed in relation to the other two articles. The three articles are similar in many 
respects: they relate to physical integrity and are considered to cover the most important aspects 
of the Convention. Yet, there are also important differences between the articles,104 which al-
low me to test some additional variables. For example, in contrast to Article 3, both Articles 2 
and 5 consider the individual’s contribution in the context of damages. Adding both to the 
analysis can therefore permit us to understand whether the victim’s contribution to the violation 
affects the quantum. Secondly, as far as the state as the originator of the violative conduct is 
concerned, the structure of the data is somewhat different relating to the different articles. In 
relation to Article 2 (right to life), most of the violations come from new countries (those joined 
after 1990) or Turkey. In relation to Article 3 and 5, the proportion is more evenly distributed: 
between 15-19% of cases come from old countries (those joined ECHR before 1990), 50% 
from new countries and around 30% for Turkey. If the results in the three articles – as far as 
states are concerned – are similar regardless of the different split between the countries, then 
the results will be even more robust.105  
The basic unit of analysis adopted in the paper is the individual victim. If the Court 
adopts an individualised approach to Convention rights and considers the circumstances of a 
particular case and the effect a violation may have had on the individual, then the unit of anal-
ysis has to be the individual victim. ‘Victim’ is a technical term relating to the application 
procedure before the Court.106 In order for an individual to be considered a victim, they have 
to show that they have been directly affected by a measure which arguably led to a violation 
 
102 Violations of Article 3 constituted 23% of all violations found in 2015. Annual report: https://echr.coe.int/Doc-
uments/Annual_report_2015_ENG.pdf.; Shelton (n 16) 212. Violations of Article 3 come only after a large per-
centage of cases concerning procedural delay of justice or lack of due process in violation of article 5 and 6(1). 
These constituted 40% in 2015.   
103 UN Convention against torture, 10 December 1983. 
104 One of the differences is that on average, violations of Article 2 and 5 are much less frequent: only 15% for 
2015 for Article 5 and at 7% for Article 2. 
105 Since the study was conducted, the analysis has also been expanded to other articles, including Article 6 (right 
to a fair trial and length of proceedings). The results have confirmed the relevance of many of the variables studied 
in this paper. Where relevant, these results are mentioned in footnotes of this article. They will be published in 
due course.  
106 Art. 34 ECHR.  
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and which is allegedly attributable to the respondent state.107 He or she must also show that the 
violation has not yet been redressed by the state.108  
Although my unit of analysis is the victim, judges have emphasised that they work and 
assess cases.109 For them, therefore, the unit through which compensation is determined is a 
case, rather than the victim. In this regard, the study’s multivariate regression analysis is com-
plemented by a multilevel analysis in order to control for the variation between cases and also 
within cases.110 In cases with multiple victims, such analysis allows me to determine whether 
the variables connected to the victim and which appear statistically significant are in fact rele-
vant for the determination of damages or not. As the reader will see, some results from the 
regular linear regression are dismissed because they give contrasting results to the multilevel 
analysis. 
The data is tested in several stages, in order to test to what extent the variables associ-
ated with victim and the state affect the quantum. In the first model, I focus on variables related 
exclusively to the victim. In this regard, the model analyses how much of the non-pecuniary 
satisfaction award can be explained by variables related to the individual applicant. The second 
model looks at the state and its conduct. In this context, I look at who the state is and whether 
they are a systemic violator. Then, I look at how their conduct has been qualified by the Court 
(and therefore how serious the violation is). In addition to these two main models, I also inves-
tigate to what extent the award of damages is determined by the simple act of making a claim 
for damages. This is done in the preliminary model, since the rules of the Court require appli-
cants to ‘make a specific claim’ for just satisfaction. Without such a claim, ‘Court considers 
that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.’ 111 Finally, I join the three models 
to show how much variability in the data can be explained by putting all three models together. 
In all three articles, the preliminary model (whether a claim was made) and the last model are 
the best fit.  
The list of variables analysed is contained in the Annex, as well as a description of how 
they fit into the four models. The results of the regression analysis for each of the three Articles 
are provided in the annex.112 
A. The Preliminary Model – Making a claim  
Under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court any claim for just satisfaction must be itemised and sub-
mitted in writing together with the relevant supporting documents or vouchers, ‘failing which 
the Chamber may reject the claim in whole or in part’. This statement suggests that the inherent 
purpose of compensation is to ‘place … [the injured party] in the position in which he or she 
 
107 Oleksy v. Poland, App. No. 1379/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 16, 2009); Burden v. UK, App. No. 13378/05 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. April 29, 2008), para. 33.   
108 Scordino v Italy (no.1), app.no. 36813/97, Grand Chamber, 29 March 2006. 
109 Interview with ECtHR Judge 24, March 2018.  
110 Dhami, M. K, & Belton, I. (2016). Statistical analyses of court decisions: An example of multilevel models of 
sentencing. Law and Method. DOI: 10.5553/REM/.000019, https://pdfs.seman-
ticscholar.org/1276/633f2001d4a98dba9e51eb517489d54fd8b2.pdf.  
111 Practice Directions (n 51); Drozd v Ukraine, app.no. 12174/03, 30 July 2009, para 75; Gharibachvili v. Geor-
gia, app.no. 11830/03, 29 july 2008.  
112 Multilevel results can be provided upon request. The Asterix in the list of variables means: In Article 2, where 
the majority of the victims are deceased, the applicant is claiming compensation for their own pain and suffering 
due to the deprivation of life of a relative (ie victim).  In this regard, in the context of Article 2, I use an additional 
model to determine the role of the applicant (who makes the claim). This is in addition to the model which inves-
tigates the role of the victim (relative who is deceased). 
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would have been had the violation found not taken place.’113 ‘Reparations should not make the 
victims or their successors either richer or poorer.’114 In this regard, if a claimant makes no 
claim for damages, they are considered not to have suffered loss and therefore no compensation 
should ensue in such situations.115 
The empirical results reveal that whether a victim makes a claim is significantly deter-
minative of whether they are likely to get the compensation in Article 2, 3, and 5 claims.116 
The majority of those who made no claim also received no compensation (98, 85 and 97% for 
the three articles respectively). Yet, as scholars note, the European Court has awarded com-
pensation in certain cases in which the applicant has not asked for compensation or in which 
they failed to submit the claim within the required time limits. 117 In Fedorov case, for example, 
the Court held  
The applicant did not submit [a claim] within the required time-limits. In such circum-
stances the Court would usually make no award. In the present case, however, the Court 
has found a violation of the applicant’s right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading 
treatment. Since this right is of an absolute nature, the Court finds it possible to award the 
applicant 10,000 euros (EUR) by way of non-pecuniary damage.118  
Most of the cases in which an award is made regardless of the absence of the victim’s 
claim related to inhuman and degrading treatment or inhuman treatment.119 In cases in which 
ill treatment was not qualified as inhuman, the Court ruled that although it would usually make 
no award without a claim. However, the ‘absolute nature of the right’ and ‘fundamental char-
acter’ of Article 3 required it to award non-pecuniary damages. 120 
Cases in which the Court awards damages without a victim’s request are exceedingly 
rare. 121 The Court acknowledges such exceptional treatment in the use of its phrasing. On one 
side, it argues that ‘the applicant must have suffered’122 or that ‘a mere finding of a violation’ 
cannot compensate the ‘distress and frustration resulting from the procedural violation of Ar-
ticle 3’.123 The absoluteness of the provision of Article 3 appears to have a special bearing on 
the Court’s consideration. Both Articles 2 and 5, which are not absolute lead to fewer awards 
 
113 Practice Directions, ibid, para 10.  
114 Case of Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 
1 July 2006, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, [348].  
115 Pinto and van Aaken (n 87) on cases in which no claim is made.  
116 An initial look at the Article 3 data shows that out of 1128 victims, 1027 made a specific claim for damages 
setting out the amounts requested, 37 victims left the determination of the level of award to the Court (3%), whilst 
64 of applicants did not make a claim for damages or were out of time (5.6%). Out of the 64 victims who made 
no claim, 54 victims were not awarded any non-pecuniary damage. In relation to Articles 2 and 5, the picture is 
similar. 108 Article 5 victims out of 1247 made no request for non-pecuniary damages and 105 received none. 
And in relation to Article 2, 72 applicants out of 791 made no claim and out of those, 71 received no damages. 
This is confirmed in the results of the regression analysis of all three models. The act of making a claim is able to 
explain between 40-68% of variability in the data. 
117 P Tavernier ‘La contribution de la jurisprudence de la CEDH relative au droit de la responsabilite international 
en matiere de reparation – Une remise en cause necessarie’ RTDH 72 (2007) 958; Ichim (n 12).  
118 Vladimir Fedorov, Judgment of 30 July 2009; exactly the same phrasing in Nadrosov v Russia 31 July 2008; 
Borodin v Russia Judgment of 6 November 2012.  
119 Igor Ivanov v Russia, Judgment 7 June 2007, [50].  
120 Chember v Russia, Kats and others v Ukraine. Also Igor Ivanov v. Russia, no. 34000/02, § 50, 7 June 2007, 
and Mayzit v. Russia, no. 63378/00, §§ 87-88, 20 January 2005), plus any tax that may be chargeable. 
121 In the dataset, such cases were only 10, out of 64 in which no claim was made; i.e. less than 1% of the whole 
dataset of Article 3 violations. These awards appear to have been made only once a year, though perhaps this will 
change in light of the Nagmetov decision.  
122 A.N. v Ukraine, app.no. 13837/09, judgment of 29 January 2015.  
123 Korobov v Estonia, app. no. 10195/08, judgment of 28 March 2013. 
  16 
for victims who made no request. On the other side, the Court also seeks a pragmatic explana-
tion for its award. It argues that the different treatment is necessary because the applicant was 
unrepresented and that given the circumstances it was ‘exceptionally possible’124 to award the 
applicant non-pecuniary damage and that such a different approach was ‘warrant[ed]’.125  
B. The Victim Model: The Victim and Levels of Suffering 
For those victims, who do request some compensation for their suffering, the Court would be 
expected to be seeking to address the victim’s harm or loss. In this regard, one would expect 
just satisfaction to be adjusted according to variables related to the victim. On one side, the 
Court could take into account the loss reported by the victim, on the other, it could adjust the 
award depending on the particular circumstances of the individual victim. In this section, I seek 
to establish first whether the victim’s assessment of loss or harm potentially affects the final 
award. In addition, I look at whether the awards are adapted to each individual’s circumstances: 
the analysis considers the impact of applicant’s age, gender, their vulnerability (health, race/na-
tionality, gender, other) on quantum as well as serious consequences suffered by the victim. In 
the context of Articles 2 and 5, I also consider whether the individual’s contribution to the 
situation may affect the damage amount.   
1. Assessing the harm and reporting one’s loss  
The European Court of Human Rights acknowledges that ‘[i]t is in the nature of non-pecuniary 
damage that it does not lend itself to precise calculation.’126 In this context, the loss will be 
subjective to the applicant and intangible, meaning no real proof can be adduced.127 A victim 
may experience ‘specific feelings of humiliation and degradation’128 or ‘a loss of human dig-
nity’129 but those who suffer may ‘not always have an altogether clear-sighted appreciation of 
their condition.’130 In this context, individuals may feel that ‘no amount of money would be 
capable of compensating the harm suffered by them’131 and so may request only symbolic com-
pensation. In the same vein, a victim may feel that values protected under the Convention may 
be ‘incommensurable’132 and may be not willing to accept ‘anything less than an infinite sum 
of money’.133  
Given these acknowledged difficulties in the determination of non-pecuniary damages, 
the Court has adopted and regularly employs a ‘series of detailed tables setting out a method 
of calculation of non-pecuniary damage in respect of each article of the Convention.’134 As a 
 
124 Kats v Ukraine, app.no. 29971/04, judgment of 18 December 2008.  
125 X v. Croatia, app. no. 11223/04, judgment of 17 July 2008; Mayzit v. Russia, app.no. 63378/00, Judgment of 
20 January 2005).  
126 Practice Directions (n 51), para 14.  
127 This subjective element of non-pecuniary damage has been criticised by judges. In Kasperovičius, Judge 
Jočiene questioned the issue that the just satisfaction claim of the applicant was ‘not supported by any medical 
evidence which might provide proof of the adverse consequence caused to the applicant, such as distress and/or 
frustration.’ Instead, he noted that ‘[t]he claim is based on the applicant’s personal assessment, which cannot be 
considered reasonable in the particular circumstances of this case.’ Application 54872/08, 20 November 2012.  
128 B. Phillips, ‘The Case for Corporal Punishment in the United Kingdom. Beaten into Submission in Europe?’ 
(1994) 43 ICLQ 153.  
129 J Vorhaus ‘On Degradation. Part One: Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2002) 31 
Common Law World Review 374, 380.  
130 Ibid.  
131 Lorse v Netherlands, app.no. 52750/99, 4 February 2003; Shismanov v Bulgaria, app.no. 37449/02, 8 January 
2009.   
132 Shelton (n 16) 29.  
133 R Posner Economic Analysis of the Law (Little Brown and Co, 1977) s 6.12, 197.  
134 Harris (n 9) 155-6.  
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consequence, the awards are standardized and in principle not influenced by the level of award 
requested. The presence of tables effectively removes the most frequent bias in damage deter-
mination – the so-called anchoring effect, when those victims who assess their harm and suf-
fering as higher also receive higher awards. This cognitive bias is regularly identifiable in tort 
and in wrongful death damage awards, when judges or juries rely too heavily on the damage 
claims made by the plaintiff. 135 Yet, before the European Court of Human Rights, the empirical 
analysis shows that there is no correlation between the amount claimed and the award pro-
vided.136 In effect, by adopting detailed tables the Court has removed the danger of anchoring 
and the request by the victim has no influence on the award received.  
Of course, this is not the complete picture. For example, when individuals who feel that 
‘no amount of money would be capable of compensate the harm suffered by them’,137 request 
only symbolic compensation, they usually receive the full amount requested. In Lorse, for ex-
ample, the victim asked for 1000 Dutch guilders as just satisfaction for detention in a maxi-
mum-security prison, which constituted inhuman and degrading treatment. The Court awarded 
the applicant the full amount in Euros, the least it has ever awarded for inhuman and degrading 
treatment. Following the tables of the Court, the victim would have likely received a higher 
amount. 138  
In addition, it is important to note that the requests for compensation often mirror the 
Court’s previous case-law. The Practice Directions explicitly invite applicants to specify a sum 
which in their view would be equitable. In practice, lawyers set an ‘equitable sum’ by looking 
at awards made in previous similar cases against the same respondent state. They then make a 
compensation request following that case law. If Court’s previous awards are taken as a guide 
for an equitable/just claim,139 the requests made are not independent of previous awards and 
will of course correlate with the amounts awarded.140  Some NGOs use the practice of mirror-
ing to push damage amounts higher. By looking at the practice and citing other cases, they 
draw distinctions with previous practice and strategically argue for an increase in damage 
awards.141 To the extent that victims and their lawyers follow previous practice, the Court may 
be willing to agree with the victim’s subjective assessment of harm and adjust the damages 
slightly higher. 
As another proof of the existence of tables, the statistics make clear that victims who 
leave the determination of the award to the Court’s discretion do not receive significantly dif-
ferent satisfaction than victims who ask for a specific monetary sum.142 This result is perhaps 
 
135 Yun-Chien Chang; Theodore Eisenberg; Han-Wei Ho; Martin T. Wells, Pain and Suffering Damages in 
Wrongful Death Cases: An Empirical Study, 12 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 128 (2015), Guthrie, Chris, Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich (2000) ‘Inside the Judicial Mind,’ 86 Cornell Law Rev. 777; Campbell, John, 
Bernard Chao, Christopher Robertson, & David Yokum (2014) "Countering the Plaintiff's Anchor: Jury Simula-
tion to Evaluate Damages Arguments," 101 Iowa Law Review 543 (2016). 
136 This appears to be affirmed by a lack of correlation between the claimed award and the award received (corr. 
-0076, not significant) and by the results of the regression analysis (see annex). 
137 Lorse v Netherlands (n 118).   
138 Normally, just satisfaction for inhuman and degrading treatment starts with 1000 Euros and 5000 Euros is the 
most frequently awarded sum.  
139 Looking at the case-law, the most that has been awarded as just satisfaction for Article 3 violation (in the 13 
years under investigation) is 105,000 Euros in Kopylov v Russia case. 989 out of 1128 Article 3 victims made a 
claim lower than that amount.  
140 corr. 258. Correlation is significant at 0.01 level. Out of 1128 victims, 87% (982) asked for less than Euros 
105,000. Similar results are confirmed in relation to Article 2 (corr. 0.153*) and (corr. 0.174*). 
141 European Human Rights Advocacy Centre, for example, has through its work secured award increases for 
disappearances from 50 to 60000 Euros. 
142 Anova Sig (.273).  
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most relevant to practitioners: as long as a claim for non-pecuniary damages is made, the indi-
vidual should get compensation regardless of whether they specify the amount or leave the 
assessment to the Court. In fact, the discovery might encourage practitioners to not set damage 
amounts in case they may inadvertently cap compensation at a lower amount than the Court 
may be willing to award. Indeed, some NGOs appear to be already aware of this practice and 
have strategically left the quantification of damages to the Court.143  
2. An individualised award 
The purported focus of the Court on the victim is tested further through the principle of equity, 
which according to the Court ‘involves flexibility and an objective consideration of what is 
just, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, including not only the position of 
the applicant but the overall context in which the breach occurred.’144 The equitable principle 
implies that the Court treats victims in similar situations similarly and those in different situa-
tions differently. Whilst the regression analysis shows that there is no variation in damages due 
to victim’s gender or age, I explore the results in relation to the other variables below. 
Victim’s vulnerability and impact of the violation  
In his book on Just satisfaction under the ECHR, Ichim argues that for victims that are partic-
ularly vulnerable, ‘the award will go towards the maximum limit.’145 He also cites two cases 
(one under Article 2 and one under Article 3) in which victim’s vulnerability was taken into 
account in the award of damages.146 I decided to test this claim in our dataset. Out of 1128 
Article 3 applicants, 225 victims were coded as vulnerable. Following the case-law, we defined 
‘vulnerability’ as including applicants that were particularly young or elderly,147 those that suf-
fered a serious or chronic medical condition148 or were vulnerable because of their gender,149 
as well as members of minorities.150 When the Court therefore in its judgment found an appli-
cant vulnerable due to their age, gender or other, we coded the applicant as vulnerable.151  The 
T-test analysis showed that there was no significant difference in award between cases in which 
applicants were qualified as vulnerable and cases in which no vulnerability was reported.152 In 
the regression analysis, the victim model shows a negative, though not significant impact of 
vulnerability on damages. The results are similar in the context of Article 2, where 371 out of 
 
143 Open Society intervention argued in favour of this tactic at EHRAC Symposium. Though note that an NGO 
may also seek to actively change the practice of the Court and encourage it to improve compensation.  
144 Varnava (n 48); Al-Skeini and others v. United Kingdom, app.no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011.  
145 Ichim (n 12) para 6.5.3.  
146 Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria no. 48609/06, 18 June 2013; Wenerski v. Poland (no. 2) no. 38719/09, 24 
July 2012.  
147 Nieciecki v Greece, app.no. 11677/11, 4 December 2012; Sarigiannis v Italy, app.no. 14569/05, 5 April 2011; 
Salmanoglu v Turkey, app.no. 15828/03, 17 March 2009, etc.  
148 Micrea Dumitrescu v Romania (n 75); Kovalchuk v Ukraine, app.no. 21958/05, 4 November 2010 (health, 
wheelchair).   
149 This is particularly the case in domestic violence cases. Valiuliene v Lithuania, app.no. 33234/07, 26 March 
2013, or in prison where a male applicant was ordered ordered to strip naked in the presence of a female prison 
officer, Wiktorko v Poland, app.no. 14612/02, 31 March 2009.  
150 Roma minority in particular: Koky and others v Slovakia, app.no. 13624/03, 12 June 2012; Dzeladinov v Mac-
edonia, app.no. 13252/02, 10 April 2008.   
151 It should be noted, however, that although all persons in custody under Article 3 are considered ‘vulnerable’ 
because they are under the control of state authorities, we did not code these as vulnerable unless the Court found 
the applicant was in a particularly difficult position because of his personal circumstances. We therefore sought 
to isolate the impact of applicant’s personal circumstances from the general position in which detainees find 
themselves. D.F. v Latvia, app.no. 11160/07, 29 October 2013; Lautaru v Romania, app.no. 13099/04, 18 October 
2011. 
152 Even taking account of all mentions of vulnerability (including those that refer to general applicant vulnera-
bility), there is still no correlation between vulnerable victims and the award provided. 
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791 victims (not applicants) are labelled as vulnerable.153 In Article 5, the victim’s vulnerabil-
ity appears to have no impact on the award.  
Scholars insist that in addition to the victim’s vulnerability, one of the elements that 
affects the level of awards is also the injury that the applicant may have suffered as a conse-
quence of state conduct.154 The Inter-American Court, for example, appears to differentiate 
between victims on the basis of whether they had suffered complete permanent or permanent 
but partial disability, a permanent injury or other injury.155 The ECtHR argues that it ‘must … 
take into account the serious consequences the treatment had on the applicant’ when evaluating 
whether the treatment ‘reached the minimum level of severity required for application of Arti-
cle 3 of the Convention.’156 Yet, it is unclear whether the Court takes the injury suffered by the 
victim into account when determining damages.  
In his opinion in Kasperovičius,157 Judge Jočiene appears to suggest that the injury 
should play a role in the setting of quantum. The case concerned a 7-day detention in poor 
conditions of a 44 year-old healthy man. The detention had ‘no negative impact … on the 
applicant’s physical health’ and based on applicant’s personal circumstances, the dissenting 
judge argued that ‘in determining the amount of the award, the above-mentioned [element] 
should have been taken into account and therefore the award for non-pecuniary damage should 
have been significantly reduced in this case.’158  
The regression analysis in the victim model shows that the impact of the violation on 
the victim will not influence the award. If an applicant develops a chronic condition as a result 
of conditions in prison, or if they are severely and permanently injured as a result of Article 3 
state conduct,159 the award will not differ considerably than in the case where the victim suffers 
no long-term consequences. The same holds in situations in which the person dies as a result 
of the violation and a relative makes the application on their behalf. The results are consistent 
across the different models.160  
The irrelevance of both vulnerability and the impact the violation had on the individual 
on damage awards is striking. It is possible that the Court takes the applicant’s vulnerability 
(age, gender, disability or health condition, ethnicity and other) into account only when estab-
lishing a violation and that, as a consequence, vulnerable individuals are more likely to have 
suffered a human rights breaches than other individuals. 161 In a similar manner, this result 
could mean that the ‘serious consequences of treatment’ are considered at the level of deter-
mining the type of ill-treatment only. Yet, once this ill-treatment has been qualified as torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, the impact of injury on damages is no longer palpable. It 
appears therefore that vulnerability or serious consequences may form part and parcel of the 
 
153 In the regular linear regression analysis, the impact of the vulnerability is significant and negative, and victims 
that have a health problem or have been singled out as vulnerable because of their nationality, race or gender, 
appear to receive less than other applicants. In the multilevel model, this negative impact on quantum is lost. 
154 O. Dörr, ‘Entschädigung und Schadensersatz’, in: R. Grote /T. Marauhn, Konkordanzkommentar zum eu-
ropäischen und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz, 2nd ed. 2013, 2148. 
155  Castro-Castro Prison v Peru, (Merits, Reparations and Costs), Int-Am Ct HR, Judgment of 25 November 
2006, Series C No.160, paras. 421, 424-5, 432-3. .  
156 Bureš v Czech Republic, app.no. 37679/08, 18 October 2012.  
157 Kasperovičius v Lithuania, app.no. 54872/08, 20 November 2012. 
158 ibid.  
159 Sacilik (n 160), case of amputation; Yermolenko v Ukraine, app.no. 49218/10, 15 November 2012.  
160 There is a slight negative impact for individuals who have only suffered risk of death but not actually experi-
enced further trauma but the results are negligible due to a low number of cases within the four categories.  
161 Ireland v UK (n 83) [162]: ‘The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on 
all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, its physical or mental 
effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim...’  
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violation and that the impact on the applicant is not significantly relevant to the setting of 
quantum.162 Once a breach has been established, personal circumstances of the victim appear 
to have no bearing on the award.  
Group vs individual cases 
The Court allows applicants whose complaints are based on the same or similar facts or appli-
cants who find themselves in similar circumstances (e.g. in the same prison) to make the ap-
plication together. Under Article 3, these mass violations cases arise particularly when deten-
tion in poor conditions163 is alleged or when breach of the Convention has arisen as a conse-
quence of police violence in the context of protests164 or mass detention.165 In Article 2 cases, 
they concern mass disappearances or hostage crises, where many individuals died at the same 
time.166 Such cases often reveal a consistent or systemic problem and touch upon issues that 
have arisen from the same event.  
In principle, appearing in a group with other claimants rather than on their own should 
not affect the level of award received. Yet, according to the textbooks on the topic, there is 
anecdotal evidence to suggest that in multiple applicant cases, compensation to each victim is 
lower than if they had appeared in a single-applicant claim.167 The results of the regular regres-
sion analysis support these statements: the group has a negative impact on the award received 
by the individual victim. Individuals receive approximately 30 euros less for each applicant in 
an Article 3 case, 67 euros less for each applicant in an Article 5 case, and 318 euros less per 
applicant in an Article 2 case.168  
The reasons for this different treatment could be evidentiary. On one side, mass viola-
tions ‘are often characterised by the fact that victims have limited evidence to show that they 
suffered a violation.’ Although this may appear counter intuitive given the scale of the viola-
tion, victims have often lost relevant documents that may prove ownership or identity; they 
may be traumatised or may have been threatened; considerable time may have passed since the 
event etc.169 All of these elements represent an obstacle to showing the failure on the part of 
the state to investigate their case. Even more, ‘the circumstances of mass violations and the 
large number of victims frequently make it difficult to compile the required evidence.’170 For 
this reason, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights accepts a lower standard of plausibility 
as proof,171 thus easing the burden on applicants. Before the ECtHR, however, the evidentiary 
difficulties apply ‘in equal measure to proving damages’.172 As a consequence, groups seeking 
 
162 The results especially regarding the impact on the victim should be tested on a bigger sample (N=12 victims 
with serious consequences.)  
163 Sakar and others v Turkey, app.no. 38062/08, 20 October 2015; Taggatidis v Greece, app.no. 2889/09, 11 
October 2011, etc. The poor conditions cases regularly concern the same prisons – Jilava, Rahova, Galati prisons 
in Romania; Ioannina prison in Greece, and special detention prisons in Russia IZ.  
164 Habimi v Serbia, app.no. 19072/08, 3 June 2014.  
165 Sacilik (n 160); Alecu v Romania, app.no 56838/08, 27 January 2015.  
166 Finogenov v Russia, app. no. 18299/03, 20 December 2011.   
167 Harris (n 9) 156; see also explanation in ECtHR, Arvanitaki v. Greece, Appl. no 27278/03, Judgment of 15 
February 2008), underlying that group cases are different. 
168 For ease of interpretation, these initial values are produced in a regular regression analysis, where the award is 
not given in a logarithmic form. All results are significant.  
169 Lutz Oette ‘Bringing Justice to Victims? Responses of Regional and International Human Rights Courts and 
Treaty Bodies to Mass Violations’ in C. Ferstman, M. Goetz and A. Stephens Reparations for Victims of Geno-
cide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 233.  
170 Ibid, 227.  
171 H. Holtzmann and E. Kristjansdottir, International Mass Claims Processes (OUP 2007), 210 and ff.  
172 Oette (n 149) 233.   
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to prove state misconduct might struggle proving their case and this might influence compen-
sation.   
In other cases, in which appearing in a group might be easier, other factors might influ-
ence the reduction in compensation. In cases alleging mass violations like inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment due to poor conditions, the task of groups is likely to be easier. The Court in these 
cases relies heavily on reports provided by the European Committee for the Prevention of Tor-
ture, which visits and assesses the state of prisons around Europe. The Court presents the find-
ings of the Committee as well as its recommendations. This reliance on an external expert and 
fact-finding body reduces the need for applicants themselves to gather evidence about their 
situation. In this regard, their inconvenience and uncertainty is alleviated. Yet, the Court has 
underlined that the sole fact of appearing as a group in a ‘single set of proceedings with a shared 
objective … alleviated the inconvenience and uncertainty experience[d] … and so meant a 
reduction in the amount of the award.’173 Appearing in front of the Court with others, therefore, 
provided individuals with support and could lead to a decrease in quantum.  
Furthermore, it is clear that when victims appear together with others who have suffered 
similar fate, they are likely to be treated similarly. In this regard, there is clearly a lack of 
individualisation. Judge de Albuquerque argues that ‘the basic compensatory principle is the 
imperative of individualised compensation, which implies that pre-determined, flat or fixed 
daily compensation will be inadmissible.’174 In particular in respect of claims in which multiple 
applicants are alleging similar conduct or find themselves affected by the same event, the 
amount of award must correspond to ‘concrete situation of each’ applicant.175 This requires 
that the duration and severity of detention conditions be taken into account.  
 The only contrast that is made between victims in group cases in Article 2 cases is based 
on the relationship the applicant enjoyed with the victim (with the partner and parents of the 
victim receiving more in damages than other relatives). The impact is especially strong in cases 
of financial dependency.176 Beyond this, however, ‘reparation measures tend to be of a general 
(and collective) nature.’177 By its nature, mass violations shift ‘the focus from the identity of 
the applicant to the nature of the violation.’178 Before the Inter-American court of Human 
Rights, for example, ‘[t]he principal approach is to award the same amount of compensation to 
all victims falling within the category, in particular for non-pecuniary damages.’179 This lack 
of individualisation can be noticed also before the ECtHR. In Taggatidis, for example, 47 ap-
plicants brought a complaint about poor conditions in Ioannina prison.180 Some of the prisoners 
had spent over 11 years in badly ventilated cells and suffered medical problems, whilst others 
lived there for a few months. For a couple of prisoners, the duration was unknown. Yet, the 
Court in awarding damages made no distinction between the victims, awarding each one 
10,000 Euros. This standardisation of amounts of compensation did not go unnoticed. In Sa-
cilik, a case concerning police violence, Judges Popović and Sajó criticised the Court’s failure 
to distinguish between the suffering of the victims:  
 
173  Arvanitaki-Roboti v Greece (2008) GC, para 29-32; also KAKAMOUKAS and Others v 
Greece (No 38311/02).  
174 Mironovas (n 67), separate opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, [15].  
175 Ibid.  
176 See multilevel results for Article 2 in annex.  
177 Oette (n 149) 223.   
178 Though this is noted in particular in the context of standing, it also explains the Court’s treatment of group 
actions. Oette (n 149) 222. 
179 ibid; citing three Inter-American Court cases: Rochela Massacre v Colombia, Case of Montero Aranguren et 
al (Detention Center of Catia) v Venezuela; and Castro-Castro Prison v Peru.  
180 Taggatidis (n 143).  
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The sums … awarded take into account neither the gravity of the injuries suffered by each 
applicant nor the respective periods for which they were unable to work. … we find it indis-
pensable to consider the amount of suffering inflicted on the applicants when awarding just 
satisfaction, especially in a situation such as the present one, where the only information 
available relating to the inhuman and degrading treatment (including, for example, the anx-
iety and helplessness the prisoners must have felt) concerns the gravity of the injuries. Those 
who suffered less should be awarded a smaller sum than those who suffered more.181  
In subsequent cases, the Court appears to have addressed the issue, at least in the context of 
poor conditions. A year after Taggatidis (and Sacilik), it applied three different amounts in 
Samaras and Tzamalis182 and later in Torregiani, Nikolaos and Lakatos.183 The Court awarded 
three different award amounts depending on the duration of imprisonment in poor condi-
tions.184 In turn, awards for poor conditions appear to be correlated with the time spent living 
in those conditions.185 
3. Conclusion 
The results of the regression analysing reveal how little relevance victim variables in fact have 
on the determination of damages. The victim model explains only between 0-5% of the varia-
bility in the award of just satisfaction.186 This is consistent across the different articles. The 
result is negligible. It suggests that the victim is clearly not at the centre of the Court’s analysis. 
We therefore turn to consider whether the variables associated with the state can better explain 
the non-pecuniary awards.  
C. The State Model: The Conduct of the State 
There are three aspects in which the state may play a role in the determination of damages: 
first, through its conduct; secondly, according to the identity of the state and how rich or poor 
it may be; and finally, how frequent a violator of the respective article the state is. These three 
variables are analysed in the next sections.  
1. State conduct  
The Convention protects a number of legal interests. Many have argued or wondered to what 
extent articles of the Convention reveal a hierarchy of rights,187 with the right to life and the 
prohibition of torture protecting the most important188 and essential legal interests and other 
articles then focusing on progressively ‘lesser’ values such as liberty, procedural justice, and 
private and family life and property. As Ichim maintains, although ‘the Convention avoids 
categorization of the rights, … the rights are listed according to their importance even if, again, 
officially there should be no hierarchy.’189  
 
181 Sacilik and others v Turkey, app.no. 43044/05, 5 July 2011.  
182  Samaras and others v Greece, app.no. 11463/09, 28 February 2012; Tzamalis and others v Greece, 
app.no.15894/09, 4 December 2012.  
183 Torregiani and others v Italy, app.no. 43517/09, 8 January 2013.  
184 Tzamalis (n 163) and same in Samaras (n 163) 7000, 10000 and 15000.  
185 N = 347 victims in poor conditions, corr. +.286***. In fact, the subsequent findings of my empirical analysis 
of Article 6 cases (which will be published in due course) show that in assessing the state’s conduct in Article 6 
cases (most of which are length of proceedings cases), the court counts the number of years of delay. V. Fikfak 
‘Quantifying Pain and Suffering in Human Rights Adjudication’, forthcoming.  
186 For Article 2, applicant r2 = 0.079, victim 0.050; for Article 3, 0.006, for Article 5, 0.021. Note that the 8% in 
Article 2 refers to the applicant and his relationship to the victim and not to the victim. The results for Article 6, 
which are not included in this article, similarly confirm the irrelevance of variables related to the victim.     
187 E. De Wet and J. Vidmar, Hierarchy in International Law, The Place of Human Rights (OUP 2012).  
188 Ichim (n 12) 128. 
189 Ibid.  
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When in 2006, a new Just Satisfaction Unit was established within the Court, its aim 
was to ‘adopt a series of detailed tables setting out a method of calculation of non-pecuniary 
damage in respect of each article of the Convention’. The Court was driven by a concern ‘not 
only to ensure consistency of awards as between the Court’s five Sections, but also to ensure 
consistency as between the different articles of the Convention that have been violated.’ As 
Harris and others argue, this was done since ‘it had been observed that on occasions the awards 
for very serious breaches (loss of life or torture) were lower than awards for lesser breaches 
(loss of liberty or freedom of expression).’190 In its study of 2006 case law, the Max Planck 
group assessed what value (in terms of compensation) was assigned to different legal interests 
as protected by the articles of the Convention. They found that the most intense type of viola-
tion – the right to life and the prohibition of torture drew the most generous compensation 
levels.191 In this regard, the hierarchy of the articles of the Convention was reflected in the 
compensation awarded.192  
 In my model, I study the gravity of the violation not as a mirror of the hierarchy of the 
different articles of the Convention, but rather by focusing on different types of state conduct 
which can lead to the violation of the same Convention article. Article 3, for example, prohibits 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. At first sight, one would expect that the Court dis-
tinguishes between these three specific conducts of the state. The Court has said that, ‘it was 
the intention that the Convention with its distinction between torture and inhuman treatment 
should by the first of these terms attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment caus-
ing very serious and cruel suffering.’193  
It is clear from the results of the dataset that in awarding compensation for different 
types of violations, the Court appears to be singling out torture in Article 3 from other behav-
iour.194 A sole act of torture generates about 20,000 Euros, compared to acts of inhuman treat-
ment generating about 1900 Euros, degrading treatment or general ill-treatment under Article 
3 about 3000 Euros and inhuman and degrading treatment at about 5600 Euros. The gap be-
tween torture and other type of state conduct under Article 3 is therefore immense. This appears 
to be consistent with the special stigma attached to torture.  
Similarly, Article 5 is divided into different paragraphs. Whilst the first paragraph sets 
out the general right to liberty and thus prohibits arbitrary deprivation of liberty, the subsequent 
paragraphs set out rights of those who have been detained in order to ensure that this detention 
is lawful. An act of arbitrary detention will generate the best compensation (around 3000 Eu-
ros) in the context of the protection of liberty, whilst Article 5-3 which protects persons pending 
trial on criminal charges will lead to considerably lesser damages (eg approximately 90 Eu-
ros).195  
It is clear therefore that the specific state conduct importantly influences the compen-
sation awarded and that one type of behaviour is singled out.196 In addition, it is hypothesised 
(by Ichim) that procedural limbs of both Articles 2 and 3 do not generate as much compensation 
as substantive violations (eg degrading treatment).197 In this context, we would expect that the 
 
190 Harris (n 9) 155-6, emphasis added. Note that there is no footnote to reveal in which cases this happened.  
191 Altwicker (n 17) 32.  
192 The study did find some discrepancies from the traditional hierarchy, eg it found that liberty cases (Article 5) 
generated less compensation than Article 6 cases (procedural justice). Ibid.  
193 Ireland v UK 18 January 1978, Series A No 25 (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25, [167].  
194 For Article 2 the results are inconclusive: the logarithmic regression puts disappearances on top, whilst the 
multilevel regression puts excessive force.  
195 The result is significant in relation to Article 5-1 violation, but not in relation to Article 5-3.  
196 Most of the conduct by the state is statistically significant. 
197 Ichim (n 12) 129. 
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failure to investigate an act of inhuman and/or degrading treatment or the failure to prevent a 
violation (as part of the positive obligation) would lead to a lesser amount of compensation 
than the act itself. The results suggest that the approach of the Court is not entirely as expected: 
in Article 3, the failure to investigate costs the state about 4000 Euros, with both inhuman 
treatment and degrading treatment generating less in compensation.198 These results are sur-
prising  – potentially suggesting that in certain respects the Court is more concerned about the 
process and how authorities respond to a case of ill-treatment than the ill-treatment itself.199 
Positive obligations therefore appear to be more important for quantification of damages.  
2. Adjusting damages to the GDP of the country 
The Court insists that the awards are adjusted depending ‘on the overall context in which the 
breach occurred’,200 i.e. the ‘local economic circumstances’.201 It is argued that the Court dis-
tinguishes between ‘victims in accordance with the level of economic development in the re-
spondent state.’202 For example, the Court held that the ‘basic award’ can be reduced ‘on the 
basis of the standard of living in the country concerned.’203 Ichim insists that the decision to 
adapt the damages is not discriminatory since: ‘it would make little sense to grant similar 
amounts for the same violation regardless of whether the applicant lives in a richer or poorer 
country … because the value of the money is different and does indeed depend on local eco-
nomic development and purchasing power.’ The sum therefore has to be adapted so that it is 
commensurate with the standard of living and ensures equivalent purchasing power in all coun-
tries.204 
 It is interesting to test these statements in the dataset. The analysis reveals that GDP is 
indeed positively correlated with the level of the award (corr. 212**).205 At first sight, there-
fore, countries who are richer will pay more for the same type of violation than countries with 
a smaller GDP. The regression analysis confirms this by showing that ‘old countries’ – coded 
on the basis of when they joined the COE and with a considerably higher GDP than the new 
countries – pay on average 5277 Euros more than new countries and even more than Turkey.206 
Similar results arise in the context of Articles 2 and 5, where the country variable has a signif-
icant impact on the awards given.207  
However, when the seriousness of violation is taken into account and the level of award 
is measured against the GDP, what becomes clear is that compensation is not always adjusted 
to ensure equivalent purchasing power. In particular, degrading treatment and general ill-treat-
ment under Article 3 receives the same satisfaction regardless of the country’s GDP. In fact, in 
the case of general Article 3 violations, the amounts appear to slightly decrease the higher the 
 
198 In Article 2, the substantive violations lead to more compensation than procedural.  
199 This is consistent with the statement by Harris that procedural violations may generate better compensation 
than acts of torture and with Max Planck findings comparing Article 6 to Article 5 awards. It is also consistent 
with a more general focus of the Court on the procedural limbs of articles 2 and 3, eg identifying specific require-
ments of effective investigation, etc: J. Kukavica et al, ‘Strasbourg’s U-turn on Independence as Part of an Effec-
tive Investigation under Article 2’, (2015) 74(3) Cambridge Law Journal 415-419.  
200 Al-Skeini n 126), para 182.  
201 Basarba OOD v Bulgaria, app.no.77660/01, 20 January 2011 [26]. Also in Practice Directions (n 51) [2].  
202 Ichim (n 12) 47. 
203 Apicella v Italy, app.no. 64890/01, 29 March 2006. Note that this was an Article 6 cases in which the Court 
has the most structured approach.  
204 Ichim (n 12) 160. This is consistent with the Court’s assertions in Mironovas (n 67).  
205 GDP is coded for the country in the specific year in which decision was rendered.  
206 The coding mirrors the coding adopted by the Max Planck Study, Altwicker (n 17), see annex.  
207 The impact of the country variable is significant also in the context of Article 6. Only in Article 5 cases does 
Turkey pay more than rich countries, though this may be due to the data (with the majority of cases coming from 
Turkey and only 15% from old countries).  
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GDP raises. This picture can be contrasted with the awards for procedural violations and tor-
ture, both of which increase with the GDP. The rise of awards for torture is particularly striking, 
with quantum doubling from 20,000 for countries with $4 billion GDP to 40,000 for countries 
with $4 trillion GDP.  
 
This graph would therefore suggest that the claim that ‘local economic circumstances’ are 
taken into account and awards are adjusted to ensure equal purchasing power might not always 
hold or might not have such as influence as to be statistically significant, at least not for all 
types of conduct within a Convention article. Instead, the GDP adjustment appears to be used 
to maximise the punishing effect of torture in rich countries but when it comes to poor condi-
tions, it appears compensation will remain pretty much similar across the different jurisdic-
tions.  
3. Dissuading systemic violators? 
If the Court is seeking to achieve deterrence through just satisfaction awards, then the level of 
the award will have to be such that state actors are deterred and persuaded that a repetition or 
continuation of breach is not economically viable. As Shelton argue, whilst retribution focuses 
on the wrongdoer and on preventing repetition of his action, a broader deterrent effort may 
seek to influence the behaviour of all potential actors (not just the future conduct of a particular 
perpetrator). Damages may therefore seek to encourage rational actors to weigh the costs of 
transgression against the anticipated benefits. In the international context, however, these de-
terrence goals, become trickier to achieve, because the defendant is ‘the state’, which has re-
sources far beyond those of an individual perpetrator and can pay compensation from the public 
treasury. If damages are to pursue a deterrent aim, if they are to act as ‘potent restraints’ against 
repetition of violations, then the ‘level of the award or the nature of remedy must be such that 
state actors are deterred and not permitted to purchase an option to continue violating human 
rights.’208 In this regard, punitive/aggravated damages will be key.209  
 
208 Shelton (n 16) 14.   
209 Though in some areas there is little correlation between severity of punishment and reduced incidence of 
wrongdoing. Nigel Biggar, Burying the Past – Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict (Georgetown 
University Press, 2003) 69.  
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 The systemic variable counts the number of cases of Article 2, 3, or 5 violation appears 
in my cohort (covering 13 years of caselaw).210 This variable produces some of the most inter-
esting results. It first shows that in the context of Articles 2 and 3, there is a slight positive 
influence on quantum. The more a country violates Article 2 and 3, the more it pays for dam-
ages. In Article 2 cases, the state pays approximately 183 Euros more for each additional case, 
whilst in Article 3 case, the state pays between 21-27 Euros more for each additional case that 
appears in the cohort. These results are significant, though amounts are negligible and can 
hardly be called punitive. Even more interesting are results in respect of Article 5, where states 
pay on average 10-15 Euros less for every additional case of Article 5. This implies that the 
more a country violates Article 5, the less it pays. I have argued elsewhere211 that the same 
pattern of ‘price reduction’ can be noticed in the Burmych v Ukraine case, where in a series of 
decisions relating to the non-enforcement of judgments of Ukrainian courts (ie violations of 
Article 6), the ECtHR reduced compensation for individuals waiting for enforcement from the 
initial €5,000 for non-pecuniary damage in 1999 to €1,000 in 2015. From 1999 to 2015, the 
‘price’ for non-enforcement of domestic judicial decisions had therefore fallen from €5,000 to 
20 per cent of this amount.212  
At first sight, these results are surprising. A human rights court is potentially allowing 
states to pay less the more they violate human rights norms.213 When asked about these results, 
judges admit that sometimes concerns about compliance may affect the setting of damages.214 
In this regard, if a country has many repetitive cases arising from a systemic violation, the 
Court may be inclined to lower the award to provide ‘at least something’ to victims.215 The 
lower the damages are, the reasoning goes, the more likely the state is to pay and the more 
likely the Court is to rid itself of the large number of (repetitive) cases. Yet, according to be-
havioural economists the decision to adjust or effectively lower damages to facilitate states’ 
compliance has no deterrent effect and, may potentially be leading to the potential collapse of 
the system.216 In 2017, in Burmych v. Ukraine, when the issue of non-enforcement of domestic 
judgments arose again before the Court, the Grand Chamber effectively gave up on trying to 
incentivize Ukraine to comply with its judgments. The Court dismissed all of its remaining 
12,148 non-enforcement cases as well as any future cases217 and forwarded them to the De-
partment of Execution at the Council of Europe. The Court’s argument was that it had done 
everything it could, and now it was up to the Department of Execution to find a solution for 
the implementation of its judgments.218 The monies still remain unpaid.  
 
210 I chose this variable because it is easiest (ie can be counted). It produces comparable results as if we coded the 
term ‘systemic’ in the judgments or used the existing CIRI data, Cingranelli, David L., David L. Richards, and K. 
Chad Clay. 2014. "The CIRI Human Rights Dataset."  http://www.humanrightsdata.com. Version 2014.04.14. 
211 Fikfak (n 1) EJIL article.  
212 This result is confirmed in the larger dataset including more than 1000 cases of Article 6 claims. Results will 
be published in a forthcoming article.  
213 When I saw the initial results, I was hesitant to assume that the Court was actively reducing the quantum for 
frequent violators (distinguishing between correlation and causality). I therefore sought to verify the results in 
interviews with judges.  
214 Interviews with ECtHR Judge 27 and 30, February 2018.  
215 ibid.  
216 Louis Vischer, ‘Economic analysis of punitive damages’ in Koziol H., Wilcox V. (eds), Punitive Damages: 
Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives, Tort and Insurance Law book series (25), Springer Vienna, 2009 on 
how damages should be unpredictable, high and individualized in order to have deterrent effect.  
217 Burmych and Others v. Ukraine, Appl. no. 46852/13, Judgment of 12 October 2017, para 6; Dissenting Opin-
ions of Judges Yudkivska, Sajó, Bianku, Karakas, De Gaetano, Laffranque and Motoc on pro futuro aspect of the 
judgment.  
218 This conclusion was challenged by very strong dissents. Burmych and Others v. Ukraine, ibid, paras 13, 19, 
Dissenting Opinions of Judges Yudkivska, Sajó, Bianku, Karakas, De Gaetano, Laffranque and Motoc. 
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This focus on compliance is intriguing – the just compensation awarded is therefore not 
motivated by the victim, but by what the state can pay. This result appears almost counterintu-
itive. But if we consider this from the perspective of the institution of the Court, perhaps the 
approach is not surprising: the European Court is overwhelmed with applications. On average, 
the Court received between 61,100 applications per year between 2010 and 2017.219 Even more 
importantly, most of the applications received involve repetitive violations against the same 
countries. The desire to rid itself of these cases, to wipe them from the docket, is more than 
understandable. From the perspective of the institution, it might even be crucial for the survival 
of the Court.220 In this regard, all but one judge underlined that the cases before it are ‘not about 
money’; indeed, compensation is merely ‘symbolic’.221 This symbolism and discretion the 
Court enjoys in the setting of just satisfaction under Article 41 allows judges to set the quantum 
by paying regard to other goals, such as compliance and docket control, rather than the victim.   
III. THE TWO MODELS COMPARED: THE IRRELEVANT VIC-
TIM AND THE STATE’S INFLUENCE ON DAMAGES 
The data analysis reveals a discrepancy between what the Court says it is doing and what is in 
fact happening. They show that the victim is wholly neglected in the Court’s consideration of 
damages. Her vulnerability, individual circumstances and consequences she may have suffered 
are mostly ignored (including death). In group cases, the award is not individualised and the 
victim depends on others in the group. 222 As I mentioned above, the results of the regression 
analysing reveal that the victim model explains only between 0-5% of the variability in the 
award of just satisfaction. The result suggests that the victim is clearly not at the centre of the 
Court’s analysis. Although the Court, whose main is to deliver individual justice and who in-
sists its aim in awarding damages is to compensate the victim for their pain and suffering, this 
is clearly not understood in subjective terms or by paying attention to the particular circum-
stances of the victim.  
In contrast to the victim model, the state model can explain at least twice as much of 
variability in the data as variables related to the victim (up to an additional 15% of variability 
in the data).223 It is striking that all state variables have a significant impact on the determina-
tion of the quantum: the identity of the country, the qualification of state conduct and the meas-
urement of the frequency of such conduct. The Court appears to be focusing on state conduct 
and determines damages depending on how that conduct has been qualified (e.g. as torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment). Damages for torture/excessive force/arbitrary detention are 
considerably elevated and adjusted on the basis of the country’s GDP. In principle, therefore, 
rich countries pay more for the same type of behaviour than poor countries. Although the Court 
asserts it is seeking to ensure equal purchasing power of the victim across all violations, this 
appears true only to a limited extent (eg with certain type of behaviour, like poor conditions, 
 
219 European Court of Human Rights, ‘The ECHR in facts and figures 2017’ (2018) 5.   
220 The Court regularly receives threats from states that they may withdraw funding if decisions do not suit the 
respondents. The Court is naturally sensitive to these threats and, as some have argued, may be internalizing the 
discontent of states by adapting its approach to rights. As Helene Tigroudja put it: ‘The Court is paralysed by the 
fear of non-compliance.’ Hauser 25th Anniversary, NYU Law School, 11 October 2019, 
https://www.law.nyu.edu/global/globalevents/hauser25th.    
221 Interviews with ECtHR Judges 27 and 30, February 2018.  
222 In addition, applicant’s contribution appears to have no bearing on the awards made, although the Court asserts 
that it will not provide damages to terrorists or others who have contributed to their situations. Eg Article 2, 
McCann case, app.no. 18984/91, 27 September 1995.  
223 Though if awards are not given in a logarithmic form, the state variables can explain much more of the varia-
bility in the data, up to 40%.  
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remaining similarly priced across different GDPs). Finally, if the Court is seeking to dissuade 
systemic violators of human rights, the regression analysis suggests that only up to 27 Euros 
extra in Article 3 is paid for every additional violation the Court has found against that country 
in its docket. In Article 5 cases, this number is negative, suggesting that frequent violators get 
a discount on quantity in order to facilitate easier compliance with numerous ECtHR decisions.  
There are of course a number of problems with the approach uncovered. First, if the 
general image of the ECtHR is one of a forum available to every human rights victim – to hear 
her claim and to redress the violation, the results clearly show that although access to the Court 
may be about the victim, damages most certainly are not. Instead, there is a clear shift from the 
victim to the state – what it might be able to pay or what it may be able to comply with. This 
differs greatly from the individual justice narrative the Court is trying to portray about itself. 
In fact, it almost reminds of the arguments made by Laurence Helfer in his EJIL article on the 
embeddedness of the ECtHR framework into the domestic framework.224 Helfer argues that 
the Court has to look for new ways in which it can work with states and state organs to facilitate 
the embeddedness of the Convention into the domestic legal system. This includes looking for 
innovative and state-specific measures to address human rights violations in specific jurisdic-
tions and to help these states – through domestic courts and governments – redress human 
rights violations themselves.225 Though Helfer talks mostly about subsidiarity and the margin 
of appreciation, the discounts used to facilitate payment of just satisfaction may also be one 
tool (though unexpected) to help states with compliance with the ECtHR.   
It is an open question whether the Court is correct to reduce just satisfaction in cases 
involving frequent violators with the aim to facilitate compliance.226  I have argued elsewhere 
that the Court’s approach goes against much of behavioural economics literature, which instead 
recommends the use of punitive damages to motivate states to change their behaviour.227 Prac-
titioners appearing before the Court similarly argue that low damage amounts together with 
states’ belief that the payment of compensation concludes the case, mean that the system con-
tains no real incentive to motivate states to address and remove systemic problems at home. 
Instead, the payment of damages frequently means that for states the issue is resolved and the 
‘door is closed’. Often, however, the underlying problem still remains and generates new re-
petitive cases. The question therefore remains as to whether the Court in its approach to dam-
age-setting should be concerned with compliance and whether by making repetitive violations 
cheaper, it is enabling frequent violators to ‘pay off’ their behaviour more easily and failing to 
deter future violations.   
The second problem uncovered by the study is that the position of the victim is further 
undermined by information asymmetry about the potential remedies. By keeping the scales 
according to which damages are calculated secret, the Court is putting a disproportionate bur-
den on the victims. Victims have to invest disproportionate amounts of time and effort (as well 
as money) to bring their claims to the Court. Often, they are unaware of how small the damage 
amounts will be. In contrast, States who appear frequently before the Court know precisely and 
accurately how much a certain type of behaviour may cost. Torture costs about 20 000 Euros, 
a disappearance 60 000 Euros, and arbitrary detention – depending on the respective paragraph 
of Article 5 between 25 Euros a day and 500 Euros a day. As I have argued elsewhere, some 
countries are aware of the type of cases coming through the pipeline of the Court and are able 
to ‘plan’ how much the violations will cost. An intriguing example of such behaviour is Russia, 
 
224 Helfer (n 15).   
225 Ibid., 141 ff. 
226 To my knowledge, the Court currently does not have the empirical data to assess whether and in which cases 
lower damage amounts lead to better compliance.  
227 Fikfak (n 1) EJIL Article.  
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which is one of the worst systemic violators of the ECHR (together with Turkey, Romania and 
Ukraine). Russian legislation explicitly requires that the country’s annual budget contains a 
part intended to pay off ECHR violations.228 Between 2010 and 2016, the amount ‘reserved’ 
for ECHR compensation was respectively 114 million rubles (US $1.7 million) and 500 million 
rubles (US $7.6 million).229 Although we cannot conclude from this that Russia ‘plans’ its vi-
olations in advance, the budgeting clearly reveals that Russia is able to calculate in advance 
how much ECtHR violations will cost in a given year. The same cannot be said of victims of 
human rights violations. As a rule, they remain ignorant of the low amounts of compensation 
and if offered friendly settlement, are often unable to assess whether the offer made is compa-
rable to prior cases or not.230 The publication of the scales according to which damage amounts 
are calculated (which the Court has thus far resisted) would go some way towards addressing 
this information asymmetry.  
Whilst the current practice of the Court in relation to damages is to a large extent dic-
tated by precedent and scales, which have sought to consolidate this precedent into consistent 
practice, this year the Court is embarking on a revision of its just satisfaction practice.231 Im-
portant voices within the Court have suggested changes to its approach.232 Let us hope that the 
current practice – though understandable from an execution/compliance perspective – can be 
revisited in order to redress the potential commodification of human rights, which this study 
has revealed.   
 
 
228 Federal Law no. 359-FZ on the Federal Budget for 2016, 14 December 2015, Art. 21(5). 
229 Note that Russia has rejected compliance with Yukos v. Russia following a decision of its Constitutional Court 
and ‘compensation reserve’ in the budget does not therefore refer to that decision. ECtHR, Yukos v. Russia, Appl. 
no. 14902/04, Judgment of 20 September 2011. See Decision of the Russia Constitutional Court 19 January 2017, 
available in documents submitted to the Committee of Ministers, Doc. DH-DD(2017)207 (2017).  
230 Note that friendly settlements are becoming increasingly frequent and in relation to certain countries represent 
up to 50% of all cases. V. Fikfak, ‘Against Settlement before the ECtHR’ (forthcoming). Also H. Keller et al 
Friendly Settlements before the European Court of Human Rights (OUP, 2010).  
231 This was confirmed in several interviews with judges (Judges 19, 22, 24), February/March 2018.  
232 Pinto and van Aaken (n 87).  
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ANNEX:  
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES, MODELS AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
RESULTS 
A. Coding and Description of variables  
1. General coding for all three articles  
Award   Award in Euros 
Also provided logAward   Award in logarithmic form233 
 
ClaimNP  Whether claim for non-pecunairy damage made  
0 The applicant made no claim for damages   
1 The applicant made a specific claim for damages  
2 The applicant left the determination of quantum to the Court   
 
 
VICTIMquantum Exact quantum requested 
Also provided VICTIMquantumlog Claim for quantum in logarithmic form234  
 
VICTIMage   Age of the victim at the time decision rendered 
 
VICTIMgender  Gender  
0 Male   
1 Female  
 
 
VICTIMvulnerab Vulnerability 
0 None  
1 Vulnerable   
 
 
VICTIMnoingroup  Precise number of victims in case (for which violation found) 
 
Country   Respondent State  
 
233 The variable is skewed to the right, therefore we generated a new variable log(Award + 1). 
234 The variable is skewed to the right, therefore we generated a new variable log(VICTIMquantum + 1), to include 
also cases in which the applicants have left it to the discretion of the Court to determine quantum. 
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1 Old countries (accession 
before 1989) 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
2 New countries (acces-
sion 1990 onwards)  
Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Republic of Moldavia, Poland, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Re-
public, Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia, Ukraine 
3 Turkey   
   
 
 
STATEsystemic  Number of cases in the cohort which violation of Article 3 was found 
against the respondent State  
 
2. Specific coding for each article  
a) Article 3 – Torture, inhuman and degrading treatment  
 
VICTIMseriousC  Serious consequences suffered by victim as a result of violation 
0 None  
1 Death 
2 Other permanent or serious damage (loss of limb/injury or chronic ill-
ness)  
 
 
STATEConduct 
STATEArt3 Number of Article 3 violations the applicant suffered which are quali-
fied as ill-treatment  
STATEitdt Number of inhuman and degrading treatment violations the applicant 
suffered  
STATEInhuman Number of inhuman treatment violations the applicant suffered  
STATETorture Number of torture violations the applicant suffered  
STATEDegrading Number of degrading treatment violations  
STATEPositive Number of positive obligation violations the applicant suffered  
STATEEffective Number of lack of effective investigation violations the applicant suf-
fered  
 
b) Article 2 – Right to life  
 
APPquantum  Exact quantum requested 
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Also provided APPquantumlog Claim for quantum in logarithmic form235  
 
APPRelationshipwVIC Applicant’s relationship with victim   
1 Applicant is victim’s Partner   
2 Children  
3 Parents  
4 Brother/sister  
5 Other  
6 Multiple victims   
 
 
APPage   Age of the applicant at the time decision rendered 
 
APPgender   Gender  
0 Male   
1 Female  
 
 
APPnoingroup  Precise number of applicants in case (for which violation found) 
 
APPIndividualcircs  Applicant’s specific circumstances   
1 Financial dependence on victim   
2 Health problems   
3 Other   
 
 
VICTIMDeceased Is the victim deceased?  
0 None  
1 Death 
 
 
VICTIMContribution Did the victim contribute to their situation? 
0 No 
1 Yes 
 
 
 
 
235 The variable is skewed to the right, therefore we generated a new variable log(VICTIMquantum + 1), to include 
also cases in which the applicants have left it to the discretion of the Court to determine quantum. 
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STATEConduct 
STATEUnexplained Whether the victim suffered unexplained death in violation of Article 2 
STATEDisappearance Whether the victim disappeared in violation of Article 2 
STATEIntentionalK Whether the victim was intentionally killed in violation of Article 2 
STATEExcessivefor Whether excessive force was used against the victim in violation of Ar-
ticle 2  
STATEDutytoprotect Number of times the duty to protect was not abided in violation of Arti-
cle 2  
STATEEffective Number of lack of effective investigation violations the applicant suf-
fered  
 
c) Article 5 – Indefinite detention  
 
VICTIMConvicted Was the victim convicted of crime? 
0 No 
1 Yes 
 
 
STATEConduct 
STATEArticle51 Number of violations of Article 5-1 against the applicant  
STATEArticle52 Number of violations of Article 5-2 against the applicant 
STATEArticle53 Number of violations of Article 5-3 against the applicant 
STATEArticle54 Number of violations of Article 5-4 against the applicant 
STATEArticle55 Number of violations of Article 5-5 against the applicant 
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B. Models 
Variables Model 
Prelim 
Model Vic-
tim* 
Model  
State 
Model To-
gether 
Whether claimed NP damages?  X   X 
Victim: Age  X  X 
Victim: Gender  X  X 
Victim: Vulnerability  X  X 
Victim (A2): Relationship applicant  X  X 
Victim (A2): Deceased  X  X 
Victim (A2): Individual circumstances  X  X 
Victim (A2, 5): Individual contribution  X  X 
Victim (A3): Serious consequences  X  X 
Victim (A3): Convicted   X  X 
Victim: Solo or in group  X  X 
State: Country (old, new, Turkey)   X X 
State: Systemic violation   X X 
State: Legal qualification of conduct   X X 
State: Effective investigation   X X 
State: Other positive obligation   X X 
*In Article 2, where the majority of the victims are deceased, the applicant is claiming com-
pensation for their own pain and suffering due to the deprivation of life of a relative (ie victim).  
In this regard, in the context of Article 2, I use an additional model to determine the role of the 
applicant (who makes the claim). This is in addition to the model which investigates the role 
of the victim (relative who is deceased). 
 
C. Regression analysis results  
I use multiple regression analysis to examine the relationship between the amount awarded in 
moral damages and the different aspects of the case, namely variables related to the victim, to 
the state, and whether the victim made a claim. The different models are therefore defined as 
follows: 
Log(Award+1) = β0+β1x1i+⋯+βkxki+ei, i=1,….,n 
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The dependent variable (amount awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage) is the natural 
logarithm of the amount. The logarithmic transformation is used because the award distribution 
is skewed to the right (as the graphs below suggest) and it makes the distribution more nor-
mal.236   
 
 
Graphs picturing awards in Article 3, Article 2 and Article 5 cases respectively 
  
The subscript i refers to the individual victims in the selected sample of n victims. The key 
independent variables are explained in the next sections in relation to each of the articles. The 
coefficients to be estimated are the βs, and e is an error term.  
  
In addition to the linear regression, I also use a multilevel random intercepts model to control 
for the variation depending on the case (indicated by subscript j). Such a model allows for the 
error term to feature a set differences for all victims within each higher level unit (cases). In-
dependent variables at level 1 are those marked by X, whilst Z are level 2 variables (case var-
iables, which include variables: Country, STATEsystemic and number of victims in group).   
 
Log(Award+1) = β1x1ij+β1Z1j⋯+µj+eij, i=1,….,n 
 
1. Article 3 
The linear regressions in relation to Article 3 employ four models. The first one tests to what 
extent the sole action of claiming compensation can explain the variability in data. The second 
model, victim model, looks to variables associated with the victim. In this regard, I look at how 
much the victim asked for (including whether they left the determination to the discretion of 
the Court), their age and gender, their vulnerability, whether they appear in a group or on their 
own and what consequences they have suffered. This is followed by a state model, which looks 
to the variables associated with the state. In both victim and state models, I do not include the 
‘whether they claimed’ variable, but instead I only include those cases in which a claim was 
made (thus the reduced number of cases). This is to get more precise results about how much 
variables related to the victim/state may have affected their quantum, independent of whether 
they claimed variable. In this regard, the victim model contains also the quantum variable, 
which indicates how victims assessed their loss. Finally, I put all models together to see how 
the variables interact when all are considered together.  
 
 
236 J. Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics: a Modern Approach (2013) 191-4. 
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The results in the regression analysis clearly show that in addition to whether they claimed, 
variables connected to the state are the best indicators of the awards made (they can explain 
67% and 15% respectively of the data). The final model shows that in addition to whether a 
victim claimed compensation, only variables related to the state have a significant impact on 
the quantum awarded. Specifically, they show that new countries and Turkey pay substantially 
less in compensation.  
 
The results were also tested in a multilevel model, which controls for the fact that the Court 
considers cases not victims. This suggests that the best fit model is the state model (smallest -
2loglikelihood and BIC, given the number of cases). The significance of variables does not 
change considerably, though the quantum claimed by the victim and the appearance in group 
rather than individually become insignificant. 
2. Article 2 
The linear regressions in relation to Article 2 employ five models. The first one tests to what 
extent the sole action of claiming compensation can explain the variability in data. The second 
model, the applicant model, investigates how much variables associated with the applicant, ie 
the relative claiming for their own pain and suffering after the death of the victim, can explain 
the variability in data. This is different from the victim model. First, how the applicant assesses 
their own pain and suffering in this context will depend also on how they value the relative’s 
life. In this regard, it looks to who the applicant is (gender and age) and what his relationship 
was to the victim, it considers the individual circumstances in which the applicant finds himself 
after the death of the victim (financial dependence, health issues or other), and whether the 
applicant claims on their own or in a group. The second model then looks at the victim and to 
variables associated with the victim. In this regard, I look at whether the victim is deceased, 
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whether they were defined as vulnerable and whether they contributed to their situation. This 
is then followed by a state model, which looks to the variables associated with the state. As 
before, in applicant, victim and state models, I do not include the ‘whether they claimed’ var-
iable, but instead I only include those cases in which a claim was made (thus the reduced num-
ber of cases). This is to get more precise results about how much variables related to the vic-
tim/state may have affected their quantum, independent of whether they claimed variable. In 
this regard, the applicant model contains also the quantum variable, which indicates how they 
assessed their loss. Finally, I put all models together to see how the variables interact when all 
are considered together.  
 
 
 
The results in the regression analysis clearly show that in addition to whether they claimed, 
variables connected to the applicant and to the state are the best indicators of the awards made 
(they can explain 68%, 8% and 6,7% respectively of the data). The final model shows that in 
addition to whether a victim claimed compensation, the applicant’s relationship to the victim 
and variables related to the state have a significant impact on the quantum awarded. Specifi-
cally, they show that Turkey pays substantially less in compensation than old, rich countries.  
 
The multilevel model suggests that the best fit model is either the applicant model or the state 
model (smallest -2loglikelihood and BIC, given the number of cases). There is some change to 
the significance of variables – although Turkey still pays less, this appears to be not significant 
(ie Turkey), whilst financial dependance of the victim becomes relevant in the multilevel 
model.  
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3. Article 5  
The linear regressions in relation to Article 5 employ four models. The first one tests to what 
extent the sole action of claiming compensation can explain the variability in data. The second 
model, victim model, looks to variables associated with the victim. In this regard, I look at how 
much the victim asked for (including whether they left the determination to the discretion of 
the Court),237 their age and gender, their vulnerability, whether they appear in a group or on 
their own and whether they were convicted (ie to test whether convicted individuals vs others 
who have not yet been convicted are treated differently). This is followed by a state model, 
which looks to the variables associated with the state. In both victim and state models, I do not 
include the ‘whether they claimed’ variable, but instead I only include those cases in which a 
claim was made (thus the reduced number of cases). This is to get more precise results about 
how much variables related to the victim/state may have affected their quantum, independent 
of whether they claimed variable. Finally, I put all models together to see how the variables 
interact when all are considered together.  
 
 
 
The results in the regression analysis clearly show that in addition to whether they claimed, 
variables connected to the state are the best indicators of the awards made (they can explain 
42% and 11% respectively of the variability in the data). The final model shows that in addition 
to whether a victim claimed compensation, variables related to the state have a significant im-
pact on the quantum awarded. Interestingly, they show that Turkey pays substantially more in 
compensation than old, rich countries.  
 
The multilevel model suggests that the best fit model is either the state or the together model 
(smallest -2loglikelihood and BIC, given the number of cases). There is no change to signifi-
cance of variables.  
 
237 This variable is excluded in the together model because the other variable ClaimNP is included.  
